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ABSTRACT
How do foreign interests influence the policy determination process? What are the welfare implications
of such foreign influence? In this paper we develop a model of foreign influence and apply it to the
study of optimal tariffs. We develop a two-country voting model of electoral competition, where we
allow the incumbent party in each country to take costly actions that probabilistically affect the electoral
outcome in the other country. We show that policies end up maximizing a weighted sum of domestic
and foreign welfare, and we study the determinants of this weight. We show that foreign influence
may be welfare-enhancing from the point of view of aggregate world welfare because it helps alleviate
externalities arising from cross-border effects of policies. Foreign influence can however prove harmful
in the presence of large imbalances in influence power across countries. We apply our model of foreign
influence to the study of optimal trade policy. We derive a modified formula for the optimal import
tariff and show that a country's import tariff is more distorted whenever the influenced country is small
relative to the influencing country and whenever natural trade barriers between the two countries are
small.
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Governments often take actions that aﬀect the image and political prospects of politicians
abroad. With such acts, governments seek to aﬀect the outcome of forthcoming elections
abroad or otherwise inﬂuence the foreign political equilibrium. These inﬂuence activities
range from the subtle and covert to the obvious and open, and they also vary in intensity.
A typical open channel of inﬂuence is the careful use of diplomatic gestures such as bilateral
meetings between political leaders from diﬀerent countries. For instance, the President of
country A can change the proﬁle of a politician from country B by meeting with him or
her or by refusing to do so. This can be an important boost for a leader in opposition but
it can also be enjoyed by a party in government. If country B’s leader visits country A,
a formal dinner at the residence of country A’s President provides a much better image of
international dignity and ability than a string of low-level meetings. Diplomatic scheming in
the United Nations is also important. When a country receives a scolding declaration by this
international body, it is clear that the government has been outmaneuvered, which reﬂects
poorly on its ability to deal with the international community. Hence, countries interested
in aﬀecting the political equilibrium abroad spend resources trying to obtain declarations in
line with their interests and in the interest of their political allies abroad, whether they are
in government or in the opposition.
Powerful governments also attempt to change the political equilibrium in other countries
by their allocation of foreign aid or by strategically giving contracts to foreign ﬁrms. Further-
more, they exert pressure in multilateral organizations to obtain good deals for “friendly”
governments in foreign countries.1 Such countries also resort to more direct forms of electoral
inﬂuence that involve transfers to political agents. For instance, the United States routinely
allocates funds to organizations dedicated to the promotion of democracy and human rights.
These organizations tend to be aligned with certain “friendly” political parties. Moreover,
some governments have allegedly resorted to direct ﬁnancial support of their preferred po-
litical party in a foreign country.2 These actions are usually done in a covert way as they
1Dreher and Jensen (2007) document that countries that are perceived as “friendly” to the United States
obtain better deals from the IMF, and that these deals are systematically better right before elections in
those countries. Alesina and Dollar (2000) show that political concerns explain aid ﬂows. Bueno de Mesquita
and Smith (2007) provide an alternative theory of political determination of aid ﬂows, also supported by the
data.
2There are plenty of alleged examples of ﬁnancial involvement. For instance, it is believed that the U.S.
gave support to the “color revolutions” in the near abroad of Russia by supporting democratic movements
(Simes, 2007). It is also widely believed that Venezuela’s President Hugo Chavez has used oil money to
support his preferred candidates in several Latin American countries (Shifter, 2006). Weiner (2007) also
documents that the United States gave direct ﬁnancial support to certain political ﬁgures in Italy, Japan
and Chile among other countries.
1are illegal in most settings.3
In all these examples, the government in one country performs some costly deed in order
to increase the probability of electoral victory of their preferred political party in a foreign
country. In this paper we develop a model of foreign inﬂuence and study its eﬀects on
policy determination. Our theoretical framework brings to light the following key insights
associated with foreign inﬂuence. First, we show that foreign meddling in domestic aﬀairs
can only be rationalized in a world in which a country’s policies generate externalities on
other countries. Absent such externalities, it would never be rational for governments to
spend resources trying to change elections that determine policies they do not care about.
Second, and precisely due to the presence of these externalities, it becomes possible that
the existence of channels of foreign inﬂuence is welfare-enhancing from the point of view
of aggregate world welfare. Third, in a world in which all countries are both inﬂuenced
and inﬂuencers, it may be the case that each country’s welfare is strictly higher with the
possibility of foreign inﬂuence than without it. This result is a direct consequence of the fact
that foreign inﬂuence can only arise in a “second-best” world, but it involves some subtlety.
In particular, the possibility of foreign inﬂuence only leads to Pareto improvements when the
inﬂuencing power of countries is suﬃciently symmetric. Otherwise, relatively weak countries
are left worse oﬀ.
We take as our starting point a standard political-economy model of policy determination
in a democratic society. In particular, we set oﬀ by developing a two-country version of a
stylized probabilistic voting model of electoral competition in the tradition of Lindbeck and
Weibull (1987). As is standard in the literature, the two political parties in each country
announce a policy platform at some initial stage, and voters elect whichever party oﬀers
them a higher (indirect) utility. In the particular formulation we use, we abstract from
special interest politics and other electoral distortions within each country: voters have
common preferences over the policy under consideration, and hence electoral competition is
eﬃcient in that it leads to the announcement of policies that maximize aggregate welfare in
each country.4 Nevertheless, this process of electoral competition leads to worldwide eﬃcient
3For this reason, they typically involve secret service activity. These services are also used to topple
governments by fomenting and giving ﬁnancial, logistic or direct support to coups. Short of an invasion,
this is the most direct route to obtaining a favorable policy in a foreign country. For descriptions of U.S.
interventions in foreign countries, either with ﬁnancial meddling or by fomenting coups, see Kinzer and
Schlesinger (1982), Kinzer (2007), and Weiner (2007). The most notorious U.S.- fomented coups against
democratically elected governments are probably the ones in Iran in 1953, in Guatemala in 1954, and in
Chile in 1973.
4We make this assumption for two reasons. First, on theoretical grounds, this assumption allows us
to better isolate the eﬀect of foreign inﬂuence on policy determination and welfare. Second, on empirical
grounds, there is some evidence that special interest groups have a rather small eﬀect on policy determi-
nation in democratic societies. For instance, for the case of U.S. non-tariﬀ trade barriers, Goldberg and
2policy choices only when the policies under consideration generate no externalities on foreign
countries.
In practice, a large number of important policy choices generate signiﬁcant spillovers
for foreigners. Examples include announcements regarding trade policy, environmental pol-
icy, intellectual property rights protection, migration policies, FDI regulation, or military
spending. In those situations, foreigners will not be indiﬀerent as to who ends up winning
the election in a particular country. We capture the concept of foreign inﬂuence inherent
in the examples above by endowing the incumbent government in each country with the
ability to take certain costly actions that probabilistically aﬀect the election outcome in the
other country. We show that to the extent that the two political parties in a given coun-
try (say Home) announce diﬀerent platforms, the foreign government will have an incentive
to take actions that increase the relative popularity of whichever candidate is announcing
“friendlier” policies towards this foreign country. Our ﬁrst result is that in the (subgame-
perfect) equilibrium, the threat of foreign inﬂuence tends to tilt the announced policies at
Home, which end up maximizing a weighted sum of Home and foreign welfare. The weight
on foreign welfare (or foreign’s inﬂuence power)d e p e n d so nt h ee ﬀectiveness of foreign’s
inﬂuence. This eﬀectiveness in turn varies with the productivity of foreign inﬂuence, and
also with how impressionable voters at Home are. Hence, characteristics of both countries
e n du pd e t e r m i n i n gt h ee ﬀect of inﬂuence.
Although the resulting policies necessarily reduce Home welfare, we derive fairly weak
conditions under which world welfare is higher with the possibility of foreign inﬂuence. In-
tuitively, such pressure leads the Home country to partially internalize its eﬀects on foreign
welfare, hence improving international eﬃciency. Furthermore, when each country is both
inﬂuencing and being inﬂuenced it becomes a possibility that the availability of foreign in-
ﬂuence raises welfare in both countries. This, however, is only possible when asymmetries in
inﬂuencing power across countries are not too large. Pairs of countries with “balanced” inﬂu-
ence power (in a sense to be deﬁned) are relatively successful in internalizing the externalities
they impose on each other, and hence foreign inﬂu e n c ei sm o r el i k e l yt ob eP a r e t oi m p r o v i n g
in that case. Conversely, in inﬂuence relations between powerful and weak countries, the
weak country is typically better oﬀ in a world where no such meddling is possible. Indeed, it
might well be that some uneven bilateral relationships are so one-sided that world welfare is
actually reduced, as the costs in the weak country can be higher than the beneﬁts obtained
by the foreign power. Our framework also implies that large imbalances in inﬂuence power
Maggi (1999) ﬁnd that the weight of special interest groups in policy determination is statistically existent
but quantitatively small: by and large, trade policy in the U.S. in 1983 was determined as if electoral com-
petition had induced welfare-maximizing policies (see also Mitra et al., 2002, for similar results for Turkey’s
democratic period).
3will hinder the viability of international agreements that bring countries to the eﬃciency
frontier.
We next apply our framework to the study of optimal import tariﬀs. We ﬁrst show that
optimal tariﬀs under foreign inﬂuence are still proportional to the inverse of the export supply
elasticity faced by a country, but the level of these tariﬀsi slower than in standard models.
In that respect, our model helps reconcile the ﬁndings of Broda, Limao, and Weinstein
(2006), who ﬁnd a positive eﬀect of inverse export supply elasticities on import tariﬀsb u t
with a factor of proportionality much lower than that implied by theory. We also develop a
parametric example with linear demand and supply functions that introduces a parameter
governing the relative size of the two countries as well as a parameter measuring geographical
barriers between these countries. In the example, a country’s import tariﬀ is shown to be
more distorted relative to the standard optimal tariﬀ whenever the inﬂuenced country is small
relative to the inﬂuencing country (even when both countries share a common technology of
inﬂuence), and whenever natural trade barriers between the two countries are small. Finally,
we show that the viability of a free trade agreement may hinge on the existence of a negative
correlation between economic size and inﬂuence power.
Our model departs from standard political-economy frameworks that study the deter-
mination of policies as the outcome of a political game played only by domestic agents
(politicians, voters, interest groups).5 A branch of this literature has studied the implica-
tions of allowing for international spillovers of such policies and has stressed the fact that
the resulting equilibria are ineﬃcient.6 We contribute by developing a model in which there
is a direct political eﬀect of foreign actors. The existing literature on trade agreements also
considers the role of foreign governments but is very diﬀerent in scope and emphasizes for-
mal negotiations between countries. Indeed, if international negotiations were costless and
the agreements thereby reached were perfectly enforceable (or self-enforcing), the channels
of foreign inﬂuence described in this paper would obviously be dominated instruments to
achieve worldwide eﬃciency gains. In practice, however, international agreements are costly
to negotiate, the mechanisms that ensure their enforceability are still primitive, and political
turnover around the world hinders the emergence of self-enforcing agreements. Hence, in
contrast to the existing literature and to analyze the consequences of the obvious existence
of such inﬂuences, we let foreigners play an active role in a country’s political game. In that
respect, our work is related to that of Hillman and Ursprung (1988) and Gawande, Krishna
a n dR o b b i n s( 2 0 0 6 ) ,w h i c hb o t hi n t r o d u c ef o r e i g nl o b b y i n gi na l t e r n a t i v em o d e l so ft r a d e
5For the case of trade policy choices distorted by domestic lobbying see for instance Magee, Brock and
Young (1989) or Grossman and Helpman (1994).
6See for instance the two-country model in Grossman and Helpman (1995).
4policy determination.7 Later in the paper, we will discuss at greater length the relationship
between our concept of foreign inﬂuence and that of foreign lobbying.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we develop our two-country
model and illustrate how foreign inﬂuence distorts policy determination. In section 3, we
study some comparative statics that facilitate an analysis of the welfare implications of
foreign inﬂuence, which we carry out in this same section. An application of our model to
the study of import tariﬀ choices is developed in section 4. We oﬀer some concluding remarks
in section 5.
2 A Model of Foreign Inﬂuence
We begin this section by describing a benchmark, two-country model of electoral competition.
We later introduce cross-border externalities and the possibility of foreign inﬂuence and
proceed to solve for the unique convergent equilibrium of the game.
2.1 Environment and Political Structure
The political-economy side of our model is a simple variant of a probabilistic voting model in
the tradition of Lindbeck and Weibull (1987).8 We consider a world of two countries, Home
and Foreign, in which electoral competition determines certain dimensions of economic policy.
The agents of the model are (i) Home and Foreign politicians (or political parties), who seek
to win an upcoming election, and (ii) Home and Foreign voters, who seek to elect whichever
politician oﬀers them a higher indirect utility. We next describe their preferences in more
detail.
2.1.1 Voters
Each country is populated by a unit measure of individuals whose only role in the model is to
vote for their preferred candidate. As is standard in probabilistic voting models, individuals
may not be indiﬀerent between the diﬀerent candidates due to diﬀerences in the latter’s
7Hillman and Ursprung (1988) focus on showing that voluntary export restraints (VERs) can be ratio-
nalized if foreign interests are represented in the determination of a country’s international trade policy.
Gawande, Krishna and Robbins (2006) show that foreign lobbying can serve a welfare-enhancing, counter-
weighting role when the political process is distorted by domestic lobbies with interests that are misaligned
with those of the rest of the electorate.
8See Persson and Tabellini (2000) for a textbook treatment. Sections 3.5 and 7.4 cover models closest to
the one proposed here. Dixit and Londregan (1996, 1998) use a variant of this model to discuss redistributive
politics when voters belong to groups with diﬀerent political sensitivity. Grossman and Helpman (1996)
introduce special interest group activities such as campaign contributions in this framework. None of these
papers extend this framework to explicitly consider international politics.
5announced policies or due to idiosyncratic preferences across voters that are independent of
policy announcements. To capture these forces, voter preferences in country j = H,F are
deﬁned over goods aﬀected by a national government policy τj,a sw e l la so v e rg o o d so r
attributes of each candidate that cannot be credibly modiﬁed as part of the electoral platform.
In particular, we assume that the indirect utility that voter i in country j would obtain if
party c wins the election takes the form
V
i,j ¡
τ
j
c,σ
i,j
c
¢
= v
j ¡
τ
j
c
¢
+ σ
i,j
c ,( 1 )
where vj (τj
c) denotes the indirect utility from consuming the goods aﬀected by the policy
τj
c,w h i l eσi,j
c measures the additional utility that voter i enjoys when party c is in power
in country j. In the language of Grossman and Helpman (1996), τj
c represents a pliable
policy, while σi,j
c aggregates the welfare consequences of ﬁxed policy positions or candidate
characteristics that are outside the control of the politician. These ﬁxed policies can be
interpreted as voters associating political parties with distinct ideologies, diﬀerent proclivities
to ﬁght corruption or preserve national pride, or simply as diﬀerences in politicians’ personal
appeal and charisma.9
We assume that the function vj (τj
c) is continuous and diﬀerentiable and satisﬁes vj0 (τmin) >
0, vj0 (τmax) < 0 and vj00 (τj
c) < 0 for all τj
c ∈ Γ =[ τmin,τmax]. Our assumptions ensure that
there is a single policy τ that every voter i in j prefers, independently of the idiosyncratic
term σi,j
c .10 For now, our speciﬁcation rules out cross-border externalities of policies, but we
shall introduce them shortly.
2.1.2 Politicians
The political structure is identical in both countries. Each country j ∈ {H,F} is governed
by an incumbent party I who is facing an opposition party O in an upcoming election.
Before the elections, each of these parties credibly commits to a platform or policy τj
c (with
c = I,O) to be implemented should that party win the election. Parties choose τj
c from a
compact subset of the real line, i.e. τj
c ∈ Γ =[ τmin,τmax]. We will focus throughout on the
case in which equilibrium policies lie in the interior of Γ.
We assume that politicians are partially self-interested. On the one hand, politicians care
about their election prospects, as captured by the probability of their own party c winning
9Similarly, Dixit and Londregan (1995, 1996) describe the voters as trading oﬀ ideological aﬃnity with
direct economic beneﬁts from the policies under contention. Dixit and Londregan (1998) explicitly introduce
ideology in this framework.
10Previous models have emphasized conﬂict of interest within countries. As we are interested in the eﬀects
of foreign inﬂuence, we endow the country with internal consensus on the preferred policy τj. Hence, any
departure from that preferred policy must be due to international factors.
6the election. On the other hand, politicians independently care about the welfare of their
citizens. As a consequence, their preferences also depend on the enacted policy decisions. In
particular, we assume that the preferences of party c = I,O in country j can be summarized
by:
W
j
c = α
jP
j
c +
¡
1 − α
j¢
v
j ¡
τ
j
w
¢
,( 2 )
where c ∈ {I,O} denotes either the incumbent party or the opposition party, Pj
c is the
probability of party c winning the election in country j, vj (τj
w) is the indirect utility as-
sociated with pliable issues when party w = I,O wins the election, and αj measures the
degree of self-interest of politicians (which for simplicity we assume independent of political
aﬃliation). One can also interpret 1−αj as an institutional parameter measuring the extent
to which there are constraints on politicians that force them to take into account the public
interest (e.g. strength of civil society).11 The political system is such that we can associate
winning the election with obtaining more than one-half of the votes.12
2.1.3 Information and Timing of Events with No Foreign Inﬂuence
The particular values σ
i,j
I and σ
i,j
O are unknown to politicians at the time they announce
(and commit to) their platforms. In order to simplify the analysis and ensure the existence
of a unique equilibrium of the political game, we follow the bulk of the probabilistic voting
literature in assuming that the diﬀerence or bias σi
I − σi
O can be represented as a sum of a
common (country-speciﬁc) bias term σj and a voter-speciﬁc term εi,j:
σ
i,j
I − σ
i,j
O = σ
j + ε
i,j.
The idiosyncratic bias εi,j is assumed to be uniformly distributed (and independently across
i)i nt h ei n t e r v a l[− 1
2λj, 1
2λj]. This term represents the ideological dispersion of the citizenry.
For instance, citizens with positive εi,j display some degree of political aﬃnity with party I
and have higher propensity to vote for it, other things equal. The ideological distribution
of voters in country j is common knowledge before the election. In contrast, σj models a
common bias in the perception that all citizens in country j have of party I a tt h et i m eo f
casting the ballot. This common element may include last-minute revelations on candidate’s
11The preference formulation in (2) is also consistent with the following interpretation: politicians are
entirely self interested. However, as they are also citizens, they care about the eﬀect that enacted policies
have on themselves. In this case, αj measures the relative weight of the rents associated with holding oﬃce.
Our results would be essentially identical if politicians placed a weight 1 − αj on social welfare under their
announced policy rather than under that of the winning party: i.e., Wj
c = αjPj
c +
¡
1 − αj¢
vj ¡
τj
c
¢
.
12For instance, the two parties may be competing for seats in a legislature, and obtaining a majority of
seats ensures control over the policies to be implemented in the future.
7competence (such as performances in head-to-head debates) or the eﬀect of shocks to the
political environment such as an environmental disaster or judicial decisions with political
relevance. Since σj m a yh a v eb o t hd e t e r m i n i s t i ca n dr a n d o me l e m e n t sw em o d e li ta s
σj = −β
j+ξ
j,w h e r eξ
j is distributed uniformly (and independently from εi,j)i nt h ei n t e r v a l
[− 1
2γj, 1
2γj]. It then follows that the expected value of the diﬀerence σ
i,j
I −σ
i,j
O is simply equal
to −β
j. We shall thus refer to β
j as the expected pro-opposition bias in country j.
Given our assumption on the distribution of εi,j, the fraction of voters that will vote for
the incumbent in country j is given by 1/2+λ
j ¡
vj ¡
τ
j
I
¢
− vj ¡
τ
j
O
¢
+ σj¢
, which is higher
than one-half only if vj ¡
τ
j
I
¢
− vj ¡
τ
j
O
¢
+ σj > 0. Given the assumed distribution of σj,t h e
incumbent anticipates winning country j’s election with probability
P
j
I =
1
2
+ γ
j ¡
v
j ¡
τ
j
I
¢
− v
j ¡
τ
j
O
¢
− β
j¢
.( 3 )
This probability is larger the higher is the level of utility promised by the incumbent rela-
tive to that promised by the opposition and the lower is the expected pro-opposition bias.
Furthermore, the larger is the dispersion in noneconomic issues (the lower is γj), the lower
the eﬀect of platform divergence on election prospects. Naturally, the opposition antici-
pates winning the election with the complementary probability P
j
O =1− P
j
I.W e s h a l l
assume throughout the paper that λ
j and γj are small enough so that political parties never
encounter corner solutions in their maximization programs.13
To summarize, the timing of the events is as follows:
• (t =1 )The incumbent and opposition parties in each party announce a policy τj
c ∈ Γ.
• (t =2 )The value of ξ
j is realized.
• (t =3 )Elections occur, policies announced at t =1are implemented and payoﬀsa r e
realized.
2.2 Equilibrium with No Foreign Inﬂuence
We seek to characterize the subgame perfect equilibrium of this political game in which, in
each country, voters maximize (1) and politicians maximize (2). Consider ﬁrst the last stage
of the game, at which point τ
j
I, σ
j
I, τ
j
O and σ
j
O are all known. Upon the realization of ξ
j,v o t e r s
maximize (1) by voting for the incumbent party whenever −εi,j <v j ¡
τ
j
I
¢
− vj ¡
τ
j
O
¢
+ σj,
13If λ
j or γj were large enough, then it could well be the case that P
j
I became negative or larger than
1 for certain oﬀ-the-equilibrium path deviations. It would be straightforward to incorporate an analysis of
these corner solutions, but it would not add any signiﬁcant qualitative insights.
8while voting for the opposition whenever −εi,j >v j ¡
τ
j
I
¢
− vj ¡
τ
j
O
¢
+ σj.A sa r g u e db e l o w ,
this delivers a probability of winning for the incumbent party in country j equal to (3).
Rolling back to the initial stage of the game, party c = I,O in country j sets its platform
τj
c to maximize its expected welfare, that is
max
τ
j
c
W
j
c = α
jP
j
c +
¡
1 − α
j¢£
P
j
cv
j ¡
τ
j
c
¢
+
¡
1 − P
j
c
¢
v
j ¡
τ
j
−c
¢¤
with − c 6= c,
subject to P
j
I being given by (3) and P
j
O by 1−P
j
I.T h eﬁrst-order condition of this program
simpliﬁes to
£
α
jγ
j +
¡
1 − α
j¢
γ
j ¡
v
j ¡
τ
j
c
¢
− v
j ¡
τ
j
−c
¢¢
+
¡
1 − α
j¢
P
j
c
¤ ∂vj (τj
c)
∂τ
j
c
=0 .( 4 )
It is straightforward to show (see the Appendix for a proof) that this equation deﬁnes a
maximum only when ∂vj (τj
c)/∂τj
c =0 . Because our assumptions ensure that there exists a
unique τ ∈ Γ such that ∂vj (τ)/∂τ =0 , we can conclude that:
Proposition 1 In the political equilibrium with no foreign inﬂuence, both political parties
in each country j = H,F announce a common policy ˜ τj and this policy maximizes social
welfare in country j, i.e.,
∂vj ¡
˜ τj¢
∂˜ τj =0 . (5)
Proposition 1 provides a useful benchmark. In particular, note that under no foreign in-
ﬂuence, the equilibrium policies are identical to those that would be dictated by a benevolent
social planner that sought to maximize the utility of its residents. This is a well-known re-
sult in the political economy literature: even when political parties are partly self-interested
and care about their share of votes, electoral competition will “discipline” the politicians’
announced policies, in the sense that equilibrium policies will tend to maximize a weighted
sum of voters’ welfare. Because we have assumed that all voters share identical preferences
with respect to the policy variable τj, the equilibrium policy ˜ τj ends up simply maximizing
vj (τj).
2.3 Cross-Border Externalities and Foreign Inﬂuence
We have thus far treated elections and policy determination independently in the two coun-
tries. In this subsection, we modify the model above in two respects. First, we allow for
international “spillover” eﬀects of policies, in the sense that we will now allow the indirect
utility vj (·) in each country to be a function of the policies implemented in both countries. In
9particular, we will have vj = vj ¡
τH
w,τF
w
¢
,w h e r eτH
w and τF
w denote the policies implemented
b yt h ew i n n i n gp a r t i e sa tH o m ea n din Foreign. The dependence of vj (·) on the foreign pol-
icy could be positive, thus reﬂecting a positive externality of the foreign policy on domestic
welfare, or negative, thus reﬂecting a negative externality of the foreign policy on domestic
welfare. In section 4, we will discuss the particular example of an import tariﬀ,w h i c hc o r -
responds to a negative policy externality. For simplicity, we shall consider situations with
symmetric spillover eﬀects, in the sense that either ∂vH/∂τF > 0 and ∂vF/∂τH > 0,o r
∂vH/∂τF < 0 and ∂vF/∂τH < 0. For now, the only other structure that we place on the
function vj ¡
τH
w,τF
w
¢
is that is globally concave in τH
w and τF
w.
The second modiﬁcation we introduce is a simple modelling of foreign inﬂuence.I n
particular, we will allow the incumbent party in each country to take costly actions to
inﬂuence the relative popularity of each of the two candidates in the other country, and
thereby potentially aﬀect the outcome of the election abroad.14 These costly actions can
range from the dissemination of messages aimed at discrediting or extolling the incumbent
party, to diplomatic pressure on the incumbent, to outright military strikes aimed at aﬀecting
voters’ perceptions of the capability of the incumbent party to safeguard national security.
Several examples were discussed in the introduction.
It should be clear that the ﬁrst modiﬁcation alone does not have any signiﬁcant eﬀect on
the above analysis. Even with “policy externalities”, Proposition 1 still applies and country
j’s party platforms will converge to the level that maximizes country j’s welfare, taking the
policies of the other country as given, i.e.,
∂vj ¡
˜ τj,τk¢
∂˜ τj =0for j 6= k.
Even though the analysis in section 2.2 is unchanged, it is worth emphasizing that the pair of
policies
¡
˜ τH,˜ τF¢
will be unilaterally but not globally welfare-maximizing, since they will fail
to internalize their eﬀect on welfare abroad.15 This opens the door for a potentially useful
role for foreign inﬂuence.
In modelling foreign inﬂuence, we build on the work on special interest groups of Baron
(1994) and Grossman and Helpman (1996). In particular, we start by distinguishing between
two types of voters: impressionable voters and unimpressionable voters. Unimpressionable
voters in any country j are assumed to behave as in the previous section: they fully un-
14We give to each country’s incumbent party monopoly power in the exertion of inﬂuence abroad, but
this is not important for our results. In particular, this monopoly power will not generate an “incumbency
advantage,” in the sense that the probability of each party winning the election will be 1/2 in our convergent
equilibrium.
15Note also that unless vj ¡
τH
w,τF
w
¢
is separable in both arguments, the equilibrium ˜ τjs will diﬀer from
those in Proposition 1.
10derstand the platform τj
c proposed by each candidate as well as the welfare implications
of alternative values of the parameter σj governing the relative position of parties on ﬁxed
policies or the relative charisma of their politicians. On the other hand, a share of voters
are assumed to be impressionable, in the sense that their perceptions of the relative utility
level σj can be aﬀected by actions taken by third agents. We denote by θ
j the share of
impressionable voters in country j’s electorate.
Baron (1994) and Grossman and Helpman (1996) focus on the case in which the value of
σj for impressionable voters may be aﬀected by campaign contributions by special interest
groups. Our focus is instead on the inﬂuence that foreign governments may exert on an
election by aﬀecting the relative popularity of each of the two candidates. To simplify
matters, we do not model campaign contributions by special interest groups and rule out
direct monetary transfers from foreigners to any of the two candidates, although we will
brieﬂy comment on them later in section 3.3. Instead, we focus on actions taken by foreign
governments that aﬀect the popularity of the incumbent party relative to the opposition
party.
More formally, we represent voter preferences in country j when party c is in power in
country j and party c0 is in power in country k 6= j as follows:
V
i,j ¡
τ
j
c,τ
k
c0,σ
i,j
c
¢
= v
j ¡
τ
j
c,τ
k
c0
¢
+ σ
i,j
c ,( 6 )
b u tw en o wl e tt h et e r mσi,j
c be aﬀected by actions of the incumbent in country k 6= j.I n
particular, we assume that when country k’s government exerts a level of eﬀort ek ∈ R in
inﬂuencing the relative popularity of country j’s incumbent party, voter i’s relative preference
for country j’s incumbent party is given by
σ
i,j
I − σ
i,j
O =
(
ξ
j − ek + εi,j,i f v o t e r i is impressionable
ξ
j + εi,j if voter i is unimpressionable
,
where ξ
j is distributed uniformly in [− 1
2γj, 1
2γj] and εi,j is uniformly distributed (indepen-
dently across i and from ξ
j)i n[− 1
2λj, 1
2λj]. Notice that with this formulation, the share of
votes for the incumbent is now given by
Sh
j
I = θ
j Pr
¡
−ε
i,j <v
j ¡
τ
j
I,τ
k
c0
¢
− v
j ¡
τ
j
O,τ
k
c0
¢
+ ξ
j − e
k¢
+
¡
1 − θ
j¢
Pr
¡
−ε
i,j <v
j ¡
τ
j
I,τ
k
c0
¢
− v
j ¡
τ
j
O,τ
k
c0
¢
+ ξ
j¢
,
11and hence the incumbent in country j will now win the election with probability
P
j
I =
1
2
+ γ
j ¡
v
j ¡
τ
j
I,τ
k
c0
¢
− v
j ¡
τ
j
I,τ
k
c0
¢
− θ
je
k¢
. (7)
Comparing this expression with (3) it is clear that the level of foreign inﬂuence ek generates
an average pro-opposition bias β
j equal to θ
jek in country j. Intuitively, the larger is the
share of impressionable voters in country j,t h em o r ee ﬀective the inﬂuence of country k’s
incumbent will prove to be. Notice that our speciﬁcation is such that in the absence of
foreign inﬂuence, the expected pro-opposition bias would be 0.W em a k et h i sa s s u m p t i o nt o
isolate the role of foreign inﬂuence in shaping the announced policies of each country. We
let ek take either positive or negative values, so we do not need to take a stance on whether
foreign inﬂuence is aimed at discrediting or endorsing the incumbent party. Similarly, we
could let the foreign governments aﬀect voters’ perceptions of both their incumbent and
opposition parties, but since voters only care about relative utility (or popularity) levels, our
formulation is without loss of generality.16
We assume that exerting foreign inﬂuence is costly and, for simplicity, we impose a
quadratic eﬀort cost function ck ¡
ek¢
=( 1 /2)
¡
ek/φ
k¢2
,w h e r eal a r g eφ
k reﬂects that country
k is relatively eﬃcient at inﬂicting international pressure. Below, we shall relax some of our
strong assumptions on functional forms.
In sum, preferences for political party c in country j are then given by:
W
j
c =
(
αjPj
c +( 1− αj)vj ¡
τH
w,τF
w
¢
− 1
2
¡
ej/φ
j¢2
,i f c = I
αjPj
c +( 1− αj)vj ¡
τH
w,τF
w
¢
if c = O
,( 8 )
where τH
w and τF
w denote the policies implemented by the winning parties at Home and in
Foreign.
We assume that foreign inﬂuence is exerted after political parties announce their policy
platforms and before voters learn the particular realizations of ξ
j. To summarize, the timing
of events in the model is as follows:
• (t =1 )The incumbent and opposition parties in each country j announce a policy
τj
c, c = I,O.
• (t =2 )Each country j’s incumbent government simultaneously decides how much eﬀort
ej to exert with the goal of aﬀecting the electoral outcome in country k 6= j.
• (t =3 )T h ev a l u e so fξ
H and ξ
F are realized.
16In fact, incumbents will ﬁnd it suboptimal to inﬂuence the perception of both political parties in the
other country.
12• (t =4 )Elections occur in each country, policies announced at t =1by the winners are
implemented and payoﬀs are realized.
2.4 Equilibrium with Foreign Inﬂuence
We seek to characterize a subgame perfect equilibrium of the above political game in which all
political parties choose a platform τj
c to maximize their utility in (8), each incumbent party
chooses an inﬂuence level ej to again maximize (8), and individuals vote for the political
party in their country that maximizes their utility in (6).
We will show that this game admits a convergent equilibrium in which the two political
p a r t i e si nag i v e nc o u n t r yj announce a common platform τj in period t =1 . We will hereafter
focus on describing this equilibrium.17 In order to study how the inﬂuence stages aﬀects the
choice of the policy τj
c at t =1 , we can thus focus on analyzing unilateral deviations from this
equilibrium by a single political party in one of the two countries. To ﬁx ideas we consider
at length the case in which τF
I = τF
O = τF but τH
I 6= τH
O.I nw o r d s ,w ea s s u m et h a te i t h e r
the incumbent or opposition party at Home have deviated from the convergent equilibrium.
We will later discuss the alternative case in which the deviation occurs in Foreign.
Voting Stage
As usual, we solve the game by backwards induction. Consider ﬁrst the last stage of the game,
at which point the pliable policies
¡
τH
I ,τH
O,τF
I ,τF
O
¢
,t h ef o r e i g ni n ﬂuence levels
¡
eH,e F¢
,a n d
the common bias ξ
H and ξ
F have been determined in both countries. Voters at Home
now maximize (6) by voting for the incumbent party whenever −εi,H <v H ¡
τH
I ,τF¢
−
vH ¡
τH
O,τF¢
+ σ
i,H
I − σ
i,H
O ,w h e r eτF denotes the (to-be-determined) policy implemented in
Foreign. Since we assume that τF
I = τF
O = τF, voters in Home can disregard the electoral
outcome in Foreign.18 From equation (7), we have that the incumbent party at Home will
win the election with probability
P
H
I =
1
2
+ γ
H ¡
v
H ¡
τ
H
I ,τ
F¢
− v
H ¡
τ
H
O,τ
F¢
− θ
He
F¢
.( 9 )
As it will become apparent below, it will not be necessary to compute the analogous probabil-
ity PF
I in the Foreign country when both parties announce the same policy τF
I = τF
O = τF.19
17Depending on the shapes of the functions v(·), the game may also admit non-convergent equilibria. We
leave the much more cumbersome study of these equilibria for future research.
18Note that this strategic interaction between voters may potentially be a source of multiple non-convergent
equilibria.
19Obviously, when we consider a unilateral deviation in Foreign rather at Home, we would need to compute
PF
I rather than PH
I .
13Foreign Inﬂuence Stage
Consider now the stage of the game at which the extent of foreign inﬂuence is decided.
Remember that at this point political parties have announced their platforms τj
c,b u tt h e
realizations of ξ
H and ξ
F are still unknown. Consider ﬁrst the choice of foreign inﬂuence by
the Foreign government. The Foreign incumbent anticipates that if it exerts an amount of
inﬂuence eF, the Home incumbent government will win the election with a probability PH
I
given in equation (9). Using equation (8) and noting again that τF
I = τF
O = τF,w eo b t a i n
that the Foreign government will set eF to maximize
W
F
I
¡
e
F¢
= α
FP
F
I +
¡
1 − α
F¢¡
P
H
I v
F ¡
τ
H
I ,τ
F¢
+
¡
1 − P
H
I
¢
v
F ¡
τ
H
O,τ
F¢¢
−
1
2
¡
e
F/φ
F¢2
,
subject to PH
I being given in (9). This program yields a unique equilibrium Foreign inﬂuence
level:
ˆ e
F = −
¡
1 − α
F¢
γ
Hθ
Hφ
F ¡
v
F ¡
τ
H
I ,τ
F¢
− v
F ¡
τ
H
O,τ
F¢¢
.( 1 0 )
The ﬁrst obvious lesson from equation (10) is that foreign inﬂuence will only arise insofar
as the Home policy has an eﬀect on Foreign welfare, that is, insofar as there are policy
externalities. Quite naturally, the Foreign government is inclined to reduce the popularity
of the Home incumbent party (i.e., eF > 0) whenever the incumbent’s announced policy is
associated with lower Foreign welfare than the welfare that could be attained under the policy
announced by the Home opposition party. Furthermore, the extent of Foreign inﬂuence is
increasing in this welfare diﬀerence. Note that in the expression there are parameters related
both to the Home country as well as to the Foreign country. Intuitively, the amount of
inﬂuence is increasing in the eﬃciency of inﬂuence and this depends both on the capacity
of Foreign to generate pressure (as captured by φ
F and αF), as well as on characteristics
of the Home country that translate pressure into actual votes (as captured by θ
H and γH).
More speciﬁcally, a larger φ
F directly reduces the marginal cost of providing inﬂuence, while a
lower αF makes the Foreign incumbent more “benevolent” and thus more likely to undertake
a costly investment from which his country will beneﬁt but he will not beneﬁt politically.
To illustrate this last point further, note that when αF goes to 1, Foreign politicians only
care about reelection, and since we have τF
I = τF
O = τF in the deviation we are considering,
changes in the Home policy have no eﬀect on the relative popularity (and hence on the
electoral prospects) of the Foreign incumbent and the Foreign opposition. In such a case,
the equilibrium level of Foreign inﬂuence is 0.20 Moving to the eﬀect of Home parameters,
20It may seem counterintuitive that the electorate would not reward the incumbent party for undertaking
this welfare-enhancing inﬂuence eﬀort abroad. This is due to the fact that, in our model, voters are forward
looking and hence ignore past achievements when casting their ballot. One could generate a positive level
14note that a larger θ
H increases the share of impressionable voters in the Home country which
directly increases the productivity of inﬂuence in that country. Similarly, a larger γH reduces
t h ev a r i a n c eo ft h es h o c kξ
H and hence makes it more likely that changes in the relative
popularity of candidates induced by foreign inﬂuence may sway the outcome of an election.
Hence, a larger γH makes foreign inﬂuence more eﬃcient.
We have thus far only considered the incentives of the Foreign government to exert
inﬂuence at Home. Let us next study the incentives of the Home government to exert
inﬂuence under the maintained assumption of a unique unilateral policy deviation by Home
(i.e., τF
I = τF
O = τF). Note that the Home government solves
W
H
I
¡
e
H¢
= α
HP
H
I +
¡
1 − α
H¢¡
P
H
I v
H ¡
τ
H
I ,τ
F¢
+
¡
1 − P
H
I
¢
v
H ¡
τ
H
O,τ
F¢¢
−
1
2
¡
e
H/φ
H¢2
,
subject to PH
I being given in (9). Because the incumbent’s electoral prospects at Home (PH
I )
are independent of eH, the solution to be above problem is trivial and yields ˆ eH =0 .T h e
intuition is simple. Given that political parties in Foreign have announced a common policy
level τF, there is no beneﬁtf o rt h eH o m eg o v e r n m e n ti ni n ﬂuencing the Foreign election.
Before we step back to the initial policy announcement stage of the game, it is important
to characterize the foreign inﬂuence stage under the alternative unique unilateral deviation
from the convergent equilibrium. That is, whenever the initial stage features policy conver-
gence at Home (τH
I = τH
O = τH)b u tn o ti nF o r e i g n( τF
I 6= τF
O). Following the same steps as
above, it is straightforward to verify that this yields a zero level of inﬂuence by the Foreign
government (ˆ eF =0 )a n dal e v e lo fi n ﬂuence by the Home government in an amount:
ˆ e
H = −
¡
1 − α
H¢
γ
Fθ
Fφ
H ¡
v
H ¡
τ
H,τ
F
I
¢
− v
H ¡
τ
H,τ
F
O
¢¢
.( 1 1 )
Policy Announcement Stage
We are ﬁnally ready to study the initial (t =1 ) policy announcement stage. Consider the
choice of the incumbent party in country j ∈ {H,F}.W ea g a i nf o c u so nas y m m e t r i ce q u i -
librium in which the two parties in the other country k 6= j have announced a common policy
τk ∈ Γ.T oﬁx ideas consider the case in which j = H. The incumbent party at Homethen
seeks to maximize its welfare WH
I in (8) subject to the inﬂuence “reaction function” in (10)
of Foreign inﬂuence with αF =1in a more complex model featuring retrospective voting (as in Barro, 1973,
and Ferejohn, 1986). This would also be the case if a foreign policy success could reveal something about
the general competence of the incumbent. Still, as argued in the introduction, policy concessions are often
obtained through pressures that are typically made in a covert way, so it is not clear that future reelection
prospects are key in shaping these decisions.
15and subject to PH
I being given by equation (9).21 Straightforward manipulation delivers the
following ﬁrst-order condition for the choice of τH
I :
"
αHγH + 1
2
¡
1 − αH¢
+2
¡
1 − αH¢
γH ¡
vH ¡
τH
I ,τF¢
− vH ¡
τH
O,τF¢¢
+
¡
1 − αH¢
φ
F ¡
1 − αF¢¡
γHθ
H¢2 ¡
vF ¡
τH
I ,τF¢
− vF ¡
τH
O,τF¢¢
#
×
∂vH ¡
τH
I ,τF¢
∂τH
I
+
¡
α
H +
¡
1 − α
H¢¡
v
H ¡
τ
H
I ,τ
F¢
− v
H ¡
τ
H
O,τ
F¢¢¢
φ
F ¡
1 − α
F¢¡
γ
Hθ
H¢2
×
∂vF ¡
τH
I ,τF¢
∂τH
I
=0 .
(12)
A ss h o w ni nt h eA p p e n d i x ,t h eﬁrst-order condition associated with the optimal choice τH
O
of the opposition party at Home is entirely symmetric. This suggests that, in equilibrium,
both political parties in the Home country will announce a common policy whenever the
two political parties in the Foreign country also announce a common policy τF
I = τF
O =
τF. As intuitive as this may seem, the proof of this policy convergence result is somewhat
involved, so we relegate it to the Appendix.22 With this result at hand, one can follow
completely analogous steps to show that the same policy convergence result will apply to the
political equilibrium in the Foreign country, which conﬁrms the existence of the convergent
equilibrium we have been discussing (see the Appendix for details).
The convergence in policy platforms allows us to simplify the ﬁrst-order-condition in
(12), e.g., by setting. vj ¡
τH
I ,τF¢
− vj ¡
τH
O,τF¢
=0for j = H,F. In particular for any
“domestic” country j ∈ {H,F} and any “foreign” country k 6= j, we obtain the following
implicit deﬁnition of the equilibrium common policy ˆ τ
j announced by the two parties in
country j:
∂vj ¡
ˆ τ
j,ˆ τ
k¢
∂ˆ τ
j +
Ã
αj ¡
1 − αk¢
φ
k ¡
γjθ
j¢2
αjγj + 1
2 (1 − αj)
!
∂vk ¡
ˆ τ
j,ˆ τ
k¢
∂ˆ τ
j =0 .( 1 3 )
We show in the Appendix that given our assumption of global concavity of the functions
vH (·) and vF (·), when a solution ˆ τ
j to equation (13) exists, it will necessarily be unique. We
shall assume throughout that such an interior solution for ˆ τ
j exists.23 We have thus derived
the following result:
21In the objective function of the incumbent party, we can ignore the eﬀort cost associated with eH because
starting from a symmetric equilibrium with τF
I = τF
O = τF,w eh a v es e e nt h a tw em u s th a v eˆ eH =0 .
22T h es o u r c eo fd i ﬃculties is that welfare of each party is not globally concave in their announced policy.
The proof of Proposition 2 in the Appendix shows however that there exists a unique global best response
function for each party and that the intersection of these best response functions is associated with policy
convergence.
23When an interior solution to (13) does not exist, then we will have either τj
c = τmin or τj
c = τmax for
both c = I,O.
16Proposition 2 There exists a convergent political equilibrium in which the two political
parties in each country j = H,F announce a common policy ˆ τ
j and this policy maximizes a
weighted sum of domestic and foreign welfare, i.e.,
∂vj ¡
ˆ τ
j,ˆ τ
k¢
∂ˆ τ
j + μ
k→j ·
∂vk ¡
ˆ τ
j,ˆ τ
k¢
∂ˆ τ
j =0 .
Furthermore, the weight μk→j on foreign welfare is given by
μ
k→j =
αj ¡
1 − αk¢
φ
k ¡
γjθ
j¢2
αjγj + 1
2 (1 − αj)
, (14)
and is increasing in αj,φ
k, γj and θ
j, and decreasing in αk.
Because both political parties in each country end up announcing a common policy
ˆ τ
j
c =ˆ τ
j, it follows that in equilibrium the incumbent government in the other country is
actually indiﬀerent as to which political party wins the election in that country, that is
vk ¡
ˆ τ
j
I,ˆ τ
k¢
= vk ¡
ˆ τ
j
O,ˆ τ
k¢
. As a result, the equilibrium amount of foreign inﬂuence ˆ ek is zero
(see equations (10) and (11)). Nevertheless, notice that the possibility or threat of foreign
inﬂuence aﬀects the equilibrium announced policies in a signiﬁcant manner. To see this,
consider the case in which γj, θ
j,o rφ
k are very close to zero or αk is close to 1,s ot h a t ,
as argued above, foreign inﬂuence becomes extremely ineﬀective or the incentives to exert it
disappear. In such a case, we have that ˆ τ
j solves ∂vj ¡
ˆ τ
j,ˆ τ
k¢
/∂ˆ τ
j =0which is equivalent to
our result in Proposition 1 and is equivalent to stating that the common announced policy
will maximize social welfare in country j.24 Relative to this benchmark without foreign
inﬂuence, we see that whenever μk→j is positive, the announced policies in country j will no
longer maximize country j’s welfare, but will instead maximize a weighted sum of country j’s
and country k’s welfare, where the latter is the inﬂuencing country. The reason for this is that
each political party in country j now perceives that, by partly tilting their policies in favor of
foreigners, they increase their probability of electoral success. A party that does so reduces
its expected share of unimpressionable votes but can expect favorable foreign meddling and
a gain of impressionable voters that more than compensates the loss. In equilibrium, both
parties announce the policy that perfectly balances these two incentives related to political
success and the associated loss related to their partial benevolence. The extent to which
political parties in country j tilt their policies is thus increasing in their “political ambition”
24It is worth noting that even when
¡
1 − αk¢
γjθ
jφ
j > 0, the equilibrium still converges to that in Propo-
sition 1 whenever αj goes to 0. The reason is that in such case, country j’s politicians cease to care about
their electoral prospects and simply announce policies that maximize domestic welfare regardless of what
governments abroad threaten to do.
17(αj), the share of impressionable voters in their country (θ
j)a n di nt h es i g n i ﬁcance of non-
pliable issues (high γj). All these factors make foreign inﬂuence particularly eﬀective or
desirable. At the same time, the weight on foreign welfare μk→j is increasing in the eﬃciency
of inﬂuencing in country k (φ
k) and also decreasing in the degree of self-interest of foreign
politicians (αk). These two factors make the provision of foreign inﬂuence less eﬃcient or
desirable.
Because both political parties face a symmetric problem, they end up tilting their policies
in the same exact way and hence foreign inﬂuence is zero in equilibrium. Still, the possibility
of “oﬀ-the-equilibrium-path” foreign inﬂuence ends up distorting the policies announced (and
implemented) in country j.25 Country j’s policies will be relatively more distorted whenever
k’s inﬂu e n c ei sm o r ee ﬀective (high μk→j) or whenever the eﬀect of country j’s policies
on country k’s welfare are larger (as measured by ∂vk ¡
ˆ τ
j,ˆ τ
k¢
/∂ˆ τ
j). Hence, for policies
that generate no cross-border externality, the existence of the inﬂuence channel makes no
diﬀerence. We next turn to studying the welfare implications of these policy distortions.
3 Policy Distortion and Welfare
Before entering the welfare analysis, it is informative to characterize how changes in the
inﬂuence power of countries aﬀect the equilibrium determination of policies in each coun-
try. Throughout this section, we treat the weights μH→F and μF→H as parameters, but it
should be understood that changes in these weights are induced by changes in the primitive
parameters of our model, as characterized by Proposition 2.
3.1 Comparative Statics
For the purpose of deriving some useful comparative statics results, we ﬁr s tn o t et h a to u r
equilibrium conditions constitute a system of two equations in two unknowns τH and τF:
∂vH ¡
τH,τF¢
∂τH + μ
F→H ·
∂vF ¡
τH,τF¢
∂τH =0 (15)
∂vF ¡
τH,τF¢
∂τF + μ
H→F ·
∂vH ¡
τH,τF¢
∂τF =0 (16)
25Some readers might question the appeal of a model of foreign inﬂuence in which these inﬂuence activities
are zero in equilibrium. It would however be straightforward to modify our model in order to generate
positive foreign inﬂuence along the equilibrium path. This could be achieved, for instance, by introducing
uncertainty, incomplete information or diﬀerences in ideology between political parties. We believe that our
simpler formulation serves a useful pedagogical role in illustrating the eﬀects of the possibility of foreign
inﬂuence.
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Figure 1: Equilibrium Policies: An Increase in μF,H with Negative Policy Externalities
This deﬁnes implicitly τH and τF as a function of μH→F,μ F→H and properties of the
vj (·) functions. Denote by
¡
ˆ τ
H,ˆ τ
F¢
such an equilibrium. A useful way to characterize the
equilibrium is as the intersection of a Home reaction function, obtained by expressing (15)
as a function ˆ τ
H ¡
τF¢
, and a Foreign reaction function, obtained by expressing (16) as a
function ˆ τ
F ¡
τH¢
. Using the implicit function theorem, we can express the slope of these
two reactions functions as
dτF
dˆ τ
H
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
H
= −
∂2vH(·)
∂(τH)
2
¯ ¯ ¯
τH=ˆ τH + μF→H ·
∂2vF(·)
∂(τH)
2
¯ ¯ ¯
τH=ˆ τH
∂2vH(·)
∂τH∂τF
¯ ¯ ¯
τH=ˆ τH + μF→H ·
∂2vF(·)
∂τH∂τF
¯ ¯ ¯
τH=ˆ τH
(17)
and
dˆ τ
F
dτH
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
F
= −
∂2vF(·)
∂τH∂τF
¯ ¯ ¯
τF=ˆ τF + μH→F ·
∂2vH(·)
∂τH∂τF
¯ ¯ ¯
τF=ˆ τF
∂2vF(·)
∂(τF)
2
¯ ¯ ¯
τF=ˆ τF + μH→F ·
∂2vH(·)
∂(τF)
2
¯ ¯ ¯
τF=ˆ τF
,( 1 8 )
respectively. Our assumption that the vj (·) functions are globally concave implies that the
sign of the slope of these reactions functions is determined by whether the vj (·) functions are
supermodular or submodular (i.e., whether ∂2vj/∂τH∂τF > 0 or ∂2vj/∂τH∂τF < 0). When-
ever vj ¡
τH,τF¢
is supermodular for j = H,F,t h e nw eh a v et h a tb o t hr e a c t i o nf u n c t i o n s
are upward sloping. The left panel of Figure 1 illustrates this case, while imposing that the
Home reaction function is steeper than the Foreign one, a necessary condition for stability.
The middle panel of Figure 1 considers the converse case of submodularity of vj ¡
τH,τF¢
for
j = H,F, in which case the reaction functions are negatively sloped (and the relative ranking
of the slopes is again imposed by stability). Finally, the right panel of Figure 1 depicts the
case in which vj ¡
τH,τF¢
is separable in τH and τF,a n dt h u s∂2vj (·)/∂τH∂τF =0 .
19With this apparatus in hand, we can now characterize how each country’s policies will be
distorted by foreign inﬂuence. Consider ﬁrst an increase in the inﬂuence power of Foreign
over Home, i.e. an increase in μF→H. From equation (15) and the concavity of vH (·),i t
is clear that this will lead to a shift in the Home reaction function, with the direction of
the shift being determined by the sign of policy externalities. The dotted lines in Figure
1 illustrate the case of negative policy externalities. As is clear, in all cases we obtain a
decrease in the equilibrium Home tariﬀ ˆ τ
H,w h i l et h ee ﬀect on the Foreign equilibrium tariﬀ
ˆ τ
F depends on whether the functions vj (·) are supermodular, submodular or separable. In
t h ec o n v e r s ec a s eo fp o s i t i v ee x t e r n a l i t i e s ,t h es h i f ti nt h eH o m e ’ sr e a c t i o nf u n c t i o nw o u l db e
in the opposite direction, hence necessarily leading to an increase in the Home tariﬀ ˆ τ
H (and
again an eﬀe c to nt h eF o r e i g nt a r i ﬀ ˆ τ
F that depends on the slope of the reaction functions).
The intuition behind these results is straightforward. An increase in Foreign’s inﬂuence
power over Home will naturally lead to a change in the Home tariﬀ that is beneﬁcial to
Foreign. Whenever policy externalities are negative, a decrease in ˆ τ
H is beneﬁcial, with the
converse being true for the case of positive policy externalities. Note that μF→H might in-
crease for various reasons that can be grouped into three sets. First, the inﬂuence technology
of Foreign might improve (an increase in φ
F). This might be caused by increased investment
in diplomacy or secret services, or simply by obtaining a seat in the U.N. Security Coun-
cil, among other reasons. Second, a change in the institutions in Foreign might help select
politicians that are less self-interested (a decrease in αF).26 Third, Home might become
more vulnerable to foreign meddling (higher γH or θ
H). If any of these phenomena occur,
political parties at Home know that the Foreign incumbent govern becomes more prone to
intervening and that the electoral outcomes at Home are more sensitive to such meddling.
As a consequence, they tilt their platforms towards the interest of citizens in Foreign. Given
the structure of the convergent equilibrium, this implies that Home increases the distortion
on its own policy.
How do these changes aﬀect the equilibrium policy choice in Foreign? The key here is
whether policy choices are strategic complements or strategic substitutes. When the vj (·)
functions are supermodular, we have a situation of strategic complementarity and the two
equilibrium policy choices will move in the same direction (see the left-panel of Figure 1).
I nt h ec o n v e r s ec a s eo fs u b m o d u l a rvj (·) functions, policy choices are strategic substitutes
and therefore move in opposite directions (see the middle-panel of Figure 1). Finally, in the
intermediate case of separable vj (·) functions, the choices of ˆ τ
H and ˆ τ
F are independent,
which implies that the latter will not be aﬀected by changes in μF→H.
26By contrast, a decrease in αH makes country H more resilient against foreign inﬂuence, as discussed
above.
20We have so far focused on the eﬀects of an increase in the inﬂuence power μF→H of Foreign
over Home, but it should be clear that the analysis of an increase in μH→F is analogous. We
can summarize this discussion as follows (see the Appendix for a formal proof):
Proposition 3 I na n ys t a b l ee q u i l i b r i u m ,a ni n c r e a s ei nμF→H (respectively, μH→F)l e a d s
to:
1. a reduction in ˆ τ
H (resp. ˆ τ
F) if and only if there are negative policy externalities and
to an increase in ˆ τ
H (resp. ˆ τ
F) if and only if there are positive policy externalities.
2. no eﬀect on ˆ τ
F (resp. ˆ τ
H) whenever vj (·) is additively separable in τH and τF for
j = H,F;
3. a shift in ˆ τ
F (resp. ˆ τ
H) in the same direction as ˆ τ
H (resp. ˆ τ
F)w h e n e v e rvj (·) is
supermodular in τH and τF for j = H,F;
4. a shift in ˆ τ
F (resp. ˆ τ
H) in the opposite direction as ˆ τ
H (resp. ˆ τ
F) whenever vj (·) is
submodular in τH and τF for j = H,F.
Our discussion so far has emphasized the role of inﬂuence power in determining the
extent of policy distortion. The system of equations in (15) and (16) unveils a second
important force shaping this distortion. In particular, let us refer to the term
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
∂vj(τH,τF)
∂τk
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
as the policy externality eﬀect of country k in country j 6= k.27 When this eﬀect is 0,
country j’s welfare is independent of country k’s policies and thus country k exerts no policy
externalities on country j. Note that our concept of policy externalities is quite distinct from
that of inﬂuencing power. In particular, the policy externalities exerted by a country might
be related to economic size, but they may also be derived from geopolitical considerations.
These considerations do not need to make this country automatically politically powerful.
As a consequence, there is no ex ante reason to postulate that these two characteristics of
bilateral relations are correlated. We discuss some such examples below.
We next study how an increase in the policy externality eﬀect of a country aﬀects its
policy choices. The following result can be derived in a manner similar to our previous study
of an increase in μF→H (see the Appendix for a formal proof):
27In the interest of precision, we might want to sharpen this statement. We can parametrize the fam-
ily of functions vj ¡
τH,τF;κk,j
¢
such that κ0
k,j > κk,j if and only if
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
∂vj(τH,τF;κ 0
k,j)
∂τk
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ >
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
∂vj(τH,τF;κk,j)
∂τk
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
∀
¡
τH,τF¢
. In this case we say that an increase in κk,j parametrizes an increase in the policy externality
eﬀect of country k in country j. At the same time, we assume that κk,j has no eﬀect on the size of the own
partial ∂vj ¡
τH,τF¢
/∂τj.
21Proposition 4 In any stable equilibrium, an increase in the policy externality eﬀe c to fc o u n -
try H (resp. F) leads to a reduction in ˆ τ
H (resp. ˆ τ
F) if there are negative policy externalities
and to an increase in ˆ τ
H (resp. ˆ τ
F) if there are positive policy externalities.
In words, Proposition 4 states that a country that starts generating larger policy exter-
nalities will need to acquiesce more with the interests of her neighbors. This result may
seem counterintuitive, but remember that we are considering a change in the level of policy
externalities that holds political or inﬂuence power constant. In these circumstances, if a
shock increases H’s policy externalities, country F b e c o m e sm u c hm o r ei n t e r e s t e di nt h e
policy H will implement, and hence it is willing to devote more resources in order to obtain
the preferred electoral outcome. This in turn forces the H parties to propose a platform
closer to the interests in F.28
Proposition 4 provides a rationale for certain historical experiences of particular countries,
such as the case of China in the XIXth century. China’s trade relationships with the Western
Powers made it an internationally signiﬁcant country, while at the same time it was politically
weak (or conversely, the Powers were politically strong vis-à-vis China). This weakness
implied that the Chinese government was forced to implement policies far away from the
optimum for Chinese citizens. The outcome of the Opium wars is an example both of the
foreign weakness of China and a very unfavorable policy result. Note also that countries that
are rich in strategic resources such as oil or certain minerals tend to be strongly inﬂuenced
if they are politically weak. For instance, in 1953 Iran suﬀered a coup that reinstated the
Shah. This coup received strong logistical and economic support of the U.S. at the behest
of the U.K. Obviously, the main objective of such operation was to gain control on Iran’s oil
reserves. Countries might also gain signiﬁcance because of transient events. For instance,
because of geopolitical issues largely external to Laos (the Vietnam conﬂict), the importance
of this country for the United States increased dramatically in the 1960s. In a bid to seal
the Ho Chi Minh trail, the U.S. government intervened heavily in the politics of Laos and
enlisted some of its citizens in the war. Even short lived increases in signiﬁcance, such as
voting power in the UN Security Council initiate inﬂuencing activities by foreign powers.29
The main lesson from this discussion is that if a country is politically weak, its citizens
obtain less distorted policies if this country generates little policy externalities. As foreign
countries do not really care about such policies, they will refrain from any inﬂuence activity
28Increases in the policy externalities of country k in country j will not only aﬀect country k’s choices but
will generally also aﬀect country j’s policy choices. It is straightforward to show that parts 2, 3, and 4 of
Proposition 3, which applied to a change in inﬂuence power, also characterize the nature of the responses to
changes in a country’s policy externalities.
29For empirical evidence of this phenomenon, see Kuziemko and Werker (2006) and Qian and Yanagizawa
(2007).
22and domestic political competition will minimize distortions.
3.2 Welfare Eﬀects of Foreign Inﬂuence
We are now interested in characterizing the local (country-level) and global (world-level)
welfare eﬀects of the existence of these channels of foreign inﬂuence. The previous subsection
already hinted at the complexity of this question by pointing out the diﬀerent eﬀects on
policies of changes in power and the size of policy externalities. To build some intuition we
begin this subsection by characterizing the welfare eﬀects of foreign inﬂu e n c ef o rt h ec a s ei n
which the function vj ¡
τH,τF¢
is additively separable in τH and τF for j = H,F.
The Case with Separability
By diﬀerentiating (15) and (16), it is easy to show the following proposition (see the Appendix
for a formal proof):
Proposition 5 If vH ¡
τH,τF¢
and vF ¡
τH,τF¢
are additively separable in τH and τF,t h e
following is true:
1. the welfare level vj ¡
τH,τF¢
of citizens in country j is increasing in the inﬂuence power
μj→k of her country and decreasing in the inﬂuence power of the other country k 6= j.
2. world welfare is increasing in the inﬂuence power of any country j whenever μj→k < 1
and is decreasing in this inﬂuence power for μj→k > 1.
Part 1 of Proposition 5 might provide the impression that foreign inﬂuence behaves like
a zero-sum game. An increase in the power of a country is good for that country and bad
for its neighbors. However, part 2 provides an interesting nuance. Increasing the power of a
country might produce and increase in aggregate world welfare, as long as this power does
not become overwhelming or predatory (i.e., greater than 1,a tw h i c hp o i n tt h ew e a kc o u n t r y
is valuing foreign pressure higher than the welfare of its own citizens!).
This second point generates an interesting possibility: is it possible to ﬁnd power con-
ﬁgurations
¡
μH→F,μ F→H¢
that provide a Pareto improvement with respect to the case with
no foreign inﬂuence whatsoever? Proposition 5 examines changes in a single component of
the power conﬁguration vector, but to address this question we are interested in exploring
how the welfare levels of both countries are aﬀected by general changes in power.
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Figure 2: Welfare Eﬀects of Foreign Inﬂuence
Power Imbalances between Symmetric Countries
For simplicity, we ﬁrst address the eﬀect of general changes in power assuming vH ¡
τH,τF¢
=
vF ¡
τF,τH¢
for all τH,τF ∈ Γ. In this case, countries are symmetric in all respects except
for their endowment of inﬂuence power, i.e., μH→F 6= μF→H. Figure 2 presents the set
of attainable welfare levels in such a case. Examination of (15) and (16) reveals that the
Pareto possibility frontier is generated by distributions of power of the following family:
¡
μH→F,μ F→H¢
=( ω, 1
ω), for any ω ∈ (0,+∞). When power is distributed in such way,
(15) and (16) are the ﬁrst order conditions associated with the problem of maximizing a
common weighted sum of country welfare functions (e.g., vH (·)+ωvF (·)). Note also that
¡
μH→F,μ F→H¢
=( 0 ,0) must generate a welfare allocation within the Pareto frontier as long
as there are spillovers (see point A in the Figure).
Now entertain an increase in power of the Home country. In particular, we consider the
path of welfare distribution as the power distribution changes according to
¡
μH→F,μ F→H¢
=
(1,0)∆ and consider taking ∆ from 0 to +∞. Proposition 5 states that the welfare of the
Home country must increase, the welfare of the Foreign country must decrease, and aggregate
w e l f a r em u s ti n c r e a s eu pt ot h ep o i n tw h e r e∆ =1 . This corresponds to the transition
from point A to point B in Figure 2. Beyond this point, country welfares evolve in the
same direction as before but world welfare is actually reduced. Increasing the power of one
country helps internalize an externality and therefore increases world welfare. All the gains,
however, are appropriated by the powerful country and the weak country is left worse oﬀ.I f
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Figure 3: Balanced of Power and Pareto Gains
the distribution of power becomes suﬃciently unbalanced (∆ > 1) t h ec o s to ft h ed i s t o r t i o n s
introduced in the weak country are actually big enough to reduce aggregate welfare.
In contrast, consider balanced increases in the distribution of power. In particular, start
again at point A with political autarky
¡
μH→F,μ F→H¢
=( 0 ,0) a n dt r a c et h ep a t ho ft h e
welfare distribution as the power distribution evolves according to
¡
μH→F,μ F→H¢
=( 1 ,1)∆.
In this case, both countries are increasing their capacity to inﬂuence foreign elections at the
same time, and both externalities are increasingly internalized by the electoral incentives of
parties in each of the countries. As a consequence, a balanced increase in foreign meddling
might actually prove to be Pareto improving. Note, however, that this is only true up to
∆ =1(i.e., point C in Figure 2), where aggregate welfare is maximized. Any increase of
power from this point is bound to reduce utility as countries start distorting their policies
in excess.
Figure 3 provides another illustration of the welfare eﬀects of foreign inﬂuence. The two
curves in the graph represent the combinations of μH→F and μF→H —w i t h
¡
μH→F,μ F→H¢
∈
[0,1]×[0,1] — that leave Home and Foreign indiﬀerent between a world with foreign inﬂuence
a n daw o r l dw i t h o u tf o r e i g ni n ﬂuence (i.e., μH→F = μF→H =0 ). The fact that these curves
are upward sloping follows from part 1 of Proposition 5. For instance, the larger is μF→H,t h e
lower is welfare at Home in the equilibrium with foreign inﬂuence, so the larger is the μH→F
needed to restore indiﬀerence with the case of no foreign inﬂuence. Finally, the fact that these
two curves intersect only at
¡
μH→F,μ F→H¢
=( 0 ,0) is ensured by part 2 of Proposition 5 (i.e.,
b yt h ef a c tt h a tw o r l dw e l f a r em u s tb eh i g h e ra ta n yp o i n t
¡
μH→F,μ F→H¢
∈ (0,1] × (0,1]).
25Figure 3 then illustrates that a world with foreign inﬂuence will Pareto dominate a world
without foreign inﬂuence only when inﬂuence power imbalances are not too large.
That foreign meddling can be Pareto-improving is a striking result as seen from the point
of view of the lobbying literature. Our baseline model is one in which political competition
is eﬃcient in the sense that it maximizes the preferences of the polity involved. However, in
an open-economy polity, this internal eﬃciency can easily cause ineﬃciencies due to interna-
tional externalities. Countries only have an interest in inﬂuencing their neighbors insofar as
they are aﬀected by their neighbors’ decisions. As a consequence, even murky channels for
cross-country inﬂu e n c es u c ha st h eo n e sw ee m p h a s i z eh e r em i g h th a v et h ep o t e n t i a ln o to n l y
to increase world welfare, but actually to generate Pareto-improving changes in policies. It is
also instructing that the second possibility is only available for suﬃciently balanced increases
in the distribution of power.
Our model of foreign inﬂuence also has implications for the incentives of countries to
sign an agreement that sets policies at their world welfare-maximizing level. In our frame-
work, this corresponds to an agreement to move from a world in which each country obtains
aw e l f a r el e v e lvj ¡
ˆ τ
j ¡
μH→F,μ F→H¢
,ˆ τ
k ¡
μH→F,μ F→H¢¢
to a world in which each country
obtains a welfare level equal to vj ¡
ˆ τ
j (1,1),ˆ τ
k (1,1)
¢
. Part 2 of Proposition 5 ensures that
if countries could negotiate a binding agreement while exchanging lump-sum transfers, the
agreement would indeed be signed for any initial distribution of inﬂuence power. Neverthe-
less, in the absence of means to transfer utility it is not obvious that both countries would
ﬁnd it appealing to sign such an agreement.
To gain intuition on this issue, consider an initial situation in which μH→F =1and
μF→H =0 . According to the results above, political parties in Foreign will feel pressured to
announced a policy ˆ τ
F that maximizes aggregate world welfare, while politicians at Home
will announce a policy ˆ τ
H that maximizes Home welfare only. It is then clear that from the
point of view of Home, an international agreement that brings μF→H up to 1 will necessarily
be welfare reducing. In the absence of a means to transfer utility in a non-distortionary
way, Home will thus block such an agreement. Similarly, when μH→F =0and μF→H =1 ,
it will be the Foreign country that will oppose the agreement. Imagine now situations in
which political power is more balanced (i.e., μH→F ≈ μF→H). In these situations it becomes
possible that both countries would support the agreement.
To illustrate this, Figure 4 depicts the region of the parameter space
¡
μH→F,μ F→H¢
∈
[0,1] × [0,1] such that both countries would favor an agreement.30 With the maintained
assumption that the functions vH (·) and vF (·) a r es y m m e t r i c ,t h e ni ti se a s yt os h o wt h a t
the point
¡
μH→F,μ F→H¢
=( 0 ,0) will necessarily belong to this set, as shown in the ﬁgure. In
30The shape of the curves in Figure 4 follows again from parts 1 and 2 of Proposition 5.
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words, in the absence of means to aﬀect foreign elections, both countries would agree to sign
an eﬃcient international agreement. Figure 4 then shows that the emergence of imbalances
in inﬂuence power across countries may lead to the powerful country blocking this eﬃcient
agreement.
Power Imbalances and Country Asymmetries
In the analysis above, we have assumed that countries are symmetric in all respects except in
the distribution of power
¡
μH→F,μ F→H¢
. This assumption ensures that as long as μH→F =
μF→H,w eh a v eˆ τ
H =ˆ τ
F and therefore vH = vF. Note, however, that (15) and (16) imply
that if the vH (·) and vF (·) functions are asymmetric, then this will no longer be the case.
As a result, our graphs above need to be qualiﬁed whenever countries diﬀer in ways that are
not captured in μH→F and μF→H.
For instance, imagine that country F has a much higher policy externality eﬀect than
country H.T h a t i s ,
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
∂vH(τH,τF)
∂τF
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ >>
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
∂vF(τH,τF)
∂τH
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ for all τH,τF ∈ Γ. As a consequence,
even with equal inﬂuence power (μH→F = μF→H), ˆ τ
F will be much more distorted relative
to the zero-inﬂuence benchmark than ˆ τ
H. It then becomes a possibility that the proposed
balanced increase in the distribution of power,
¡
μH→F,μ F→H¢
=( 1 ,1)∆ in Figure 2, might
not lead to Pareto gains, as F might be made worse of as ∆ increases. If such asymmetries
in the level of policy externality eﬀects are suﬃciently important, the power conﬁgurations
t h a tl e a dt oP a r e t og a i n st a k et h es h a p eo fF i g u r e5i n s t e a do ft h a ti nF i g u r e3 .
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Figure 5: Pareto Gains with Asymmetric Functions
For foreign inﬂuence to lead to welfare gains for country F,i t si n ﬂuence power has to
be greater than country H’s: μF→H >μ H→F. This greater power is needed to counteract
the fact that its policies generate more externalities and are therefore more conducive to
foreign meddling. Interestingly, it follows that
¡
μH→F,μ F→H¢
=( 1 ,1) d o e sn o ta l w a y sy i e l d
a Pareto improvement with respect to the situation without any foreign inﬂuence. The
intuition is straightforward: the country that generates more externalities needs to change
its policies much more in order to ensure international eﬃciency and therefore it may prefer
a situation in which no externalities are internalized. Foreign inﬂuence therefore leads to
Pareto gains if the distribution of power is suﬃciently aligned with the policy externality
eﬀects of the two countries.31 Inspection of Figures 5 and 3 reveal however that one of our
key previous conclusions is robust to the inclusion of country asymmetries, namely, the fact
that a world with suﬃciently unbalanced inﬂuencing power will necessarily result in welfare
levels that do not Pareto dominate those of a world without foreign inﬂuence.
Country asymmetries are also relevant for assessing the viability of international agree-
ments in the absence of transferable utility. In particular, if F generates more externalities
than H, it will accept a welfare maximizing international agreement only if H is substan-
tially more powerful than F. The reason is that F needs to face a very unfavorable power
balance in order to prefer the move to the world welfare maximizing policies. Furthermore,
when the diﬀerence in externality levels across countries is large enough, it is possible that
31It is worth noting that, as a consequence, the distributions of inﬂuence power that ensure Pareto gains
might be associated with meager gains in world welfare relative to a world without foreign inﬂuence.
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Figure 6: Viability of International Agreements with Asymmetric Countries
F blocks an agreement even when inﬂuence power is identical in the two countries, as illus-
trated in Figure 6. As in the case of symmetric countries it however continues to be the case
that a suﬃciently unbalanced distribution of inﬂuencing power will hinder the viability of
international agreements.
Note that country asymmetries in the model can also be generated by changing the
sensitivity that domestic voters have with respect to domestic policies. For instance, vH (·)
and vF (·) can be such that
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
∂vH(τH,τF)
∂τH
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ >>
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
∂vF(τH,τF)
∂τF
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯∀τH,τF.I n t h i s c a s e , v o t e r s a t
Home are particularly sensitive to their politicians’ platforms. Examination of (15) and (16)
reveals that, with equal inﬂuence power, ˆ τ
F will again be much more distorted relative to the
zero-foreign inﬂuence benchmark than ˆ τ
H. Therefore, voter sensitivity provides insulation
from foreign inﬂuence. It is easy to see that such asymmetry can generate outcomes very
similar to those in Figures 5 and 6.
In general, with asymmetric indirect utility functions, the relationship between the dis-
tribution of power and the welfare of each country can display many diﬀerent patterns and
an exhaustive analysis falls beyond the scope of this paper. Moreover, asymmetries can be
caused by several diﬀerent country characteristics -e.g. size, productive structure-, and the
impact of these characteristics on policy externality eﬀects and domestic sensitivities diﬀers
depending on the particular policy examined. Therefore, to better understand the eﬀects
of power imbalances on particular policies and how these eﬀects interact with country char-
acteristics, it is necessary to analyze settings where vH (·) and vF (·) are generated by fully
speciﬁed economic models. In order to illustrate this, in section 4 we develop an interna-
29tional trade model and examine the interaction between inﬂuence power, size and welfare in
as t a n d a r dt a r i ﬀ-setting game.
The Case with Non-Separabilities
We have thus far derived welfare results for the case of additively separable indirect utility
functions. It is of interest to examine the extent to which our results survive the inclusion
of interaction or strategic eﬀects in the setting of policies.
Consider ﬁrst the case of supermodular welfare functions vj ¡
τH,τF¢
for j = H,F.A s
shown in Proposition 3, an increase in the inﬂuence power of a country will not only lead
t oab e n e ﬁcial policy response by the other country, but will also lead to a shift of the
country’s own policy in the same direction. Regardless of the sign of policy externalities,
this “secondary” reaction will necessarily prove welfare reducing for the inﬂuencing country
and welfare enhancing for the inﬂuenced country. For low levels of supermodularity (i.e.,
low ∂2vj/∂τH∂τF for j = H,F), these secondary eﬀects will tend to be dominated and
part 1 of Proposition 5 will continue to apply. Nevertheless, for large levels of strategic
complementarity it is theoretically possible that an inﬂuencing country can actually made
worse oﬀ by an increase in her inﬂuencing power. How robust is part 2 of Proposition 5 to
allowing for supermodular welfare functions? It turns out that the answer we obtain here
is still quite sharp. In particular, increases in inﬂuencing power μF→H or μH→F necessarily
increase welfare whenever μF→H < 1 and μH→F < 1, and decrease it whenever μF→H > 1
and μH→F > 1. To see this formally, we can diﬀerentiate the welfare functions and use (15)
and (16) to express:
d
¡
vH (·)+vF (·)
¢
dμF→H =
µ
∂vH (·)
∂τH +
∂vF (·)
∂τH
¶
dτH
dμF→H +
µ
∂vH (·)
∂τF +
∂vF (·)
∂τF
¶
dτF
dμF→H
=
¡
1 − μ
F→H¢ ∂vF (·)
∂τH
dτH
dμF→H +
¡
1 − μ
H→F¢ ∂vH (·)
∂τF
dτF
dμF→H.( 1 9 )
Part 1 of Proposition 3 implies that the product
¡
∂vF (·)/∂τH¢
×
¡
dτH/dμF→H¢
is nec-
essarily positive, while supermodularity ensures that dτH/dμF→H and dτF/dμF→H have the
same sign, and hence the product
¡
∂vH (·)/∂τH¢
×
¡
dτF/dμF→H¢
is also positive. We thus
see that the eﬀects of increases in foreign inﬂuence on world welfare are still crucially af-
fected by the relative size of the weight placed by each government on the welfare of domestic
residents and foreign residents. Again, relative to a world without foreign inﬂuence, world
welfare is higher with the possibility of moderate foreign inﬂuence. Still, when foreign inﬂu-
ence becomes predatory, it may lead to reductions in world welfare.32
32There is a subtle diﬀerence between the results with supermodularity and those with additive separability.
30We next consider the case of submodularity of the function vj ¡
τH,τF¢
for j = H,F.I n
light of Proposition 3 we have that, in such a case, an increase in the inﬂuence power of a
country will lead to a “secondary” policy reaction in that country that is welfare-increasing
for this country but welfare-reducing for the inﬂuenced country. For example, in the case
of negative policy externalities, an increase in μF→H not only reduces ˆ τ
H but also increases
ˆ τ
F, thus bringing the latter policy closer to the Foreign unilateral “optimum” ˜ τF, implicitly
deﬁned by ∂vF ¡
ˆ τ
H,˜ τF¢
/∂˜ τF =0 . Consequently, we have that part 1 of Proposition 5 not
only holds for additively separable welfare functions, but also for submodular ones. Because
of these secondary eﬀects, however, it becomes more complex to characterize the cases in
which an increase in foreign welfare will increase world welfare. This is reﬂected in the fact
that the second term in equation (19) is now negative. We learn from this equation, however,
that a result analogous to part 2 of Proposition 5 will continue to hold as long as the level
of submodularity is low, i.e. as long as
¯ ¯∂2vj/∂τH∂τF¯ ¯ for j = H,F is small.
The next proposition summarizes our discussion above (see the Appendix for a formal
proof):
Proposition 6 For general globally concave welfare functions vH ¡
τH,τF¢
and vF ¡
τH,τF¢
,
the following welfare properties are true:
1. the welfare level vj ¡
τH,τF¢
of citizens in country j is increasing in the inﬂuence power
μj→k of her country and decreasing in the inﬂuence power μk→j of the other country
k 6= j whenever (a) vj ¡
τH,τF¢
is submodular in τH and τF for j = H,F; or (b)
vj ¡
τH,τF¢
is supermodular in τH and τF for j = H,F and
¯ ¯∂2vj/∂τH∂τF¯ ¯ is small
enough;
2. world welfare is increasing in the inﬂuence power of any country j whenever μj→k <
1 and μk→j < 1 and is decreasing in this inﬂuence power whenever μj→k > 1 and
μk→j < 1provided that (a) vj ¡
τH,τF¢
is supermodular in τH and τF for j = H,F; or
(b) vj ¡
τH,τF¢
is submodular in τH and τF for j = H,F and
¯ ¯∂2vj/∂τH∂τF¯ ¯ is small
enough.
It is worth emphasizing that even for the case in which μF→H < 1 and μH→F < 1,a n
increase in these parameters may not always increase world welfare. This contrasts with the
results in Proposition 5 and follows from the strategic interactions in policy setting. Notice,
in particular, that equation (19) impliest h a tw h e nF o r e i g ni sv e r yp o w e r f u l( μF→H is close
to 1)a n dH o m ei sv e r yw e a k( μH→F is close to 0), a further increase in Foreign inﬂuence
In particular, in Proposition 5 it suﬃced to assume that μj→k < 1 in order to have a positive aggregate
welfare eﬀect of foreign inﬂuence, while we now need to assume also that μk→j < 1.
31power will necessarily decrease world welfare when vj ¡
τH,τF¢
is submodular in τH and τF.
Hence, increased power imbalances may generate negative welfare eﬀects at the world level.
3.3 Foreign Inﬂuence vs. Foreign Lobbying
Our setup has abstracted from foreign lobbying which constitutes an alternative channel
through which foreign residents can potentially aﬀect the electoral outcomes in a partic-
ular country. More speciﬁcally, although direct contributions by foreigners to particular
candidates are illegal in most countries, indirect contributions mediated by registered inter-
mediaries are not ruled out (see, for instance, the U.S. Foreign Agents Registration Act).
A natural question is thus how diﬀerent are the conclusions that emerge from our model of
foreign inﬂuence relative to those obtained from a model with foreign lobbying.
Without dwelling into detail, it is straightforward to show that a model without govern-
mental foreign inﬂuence but with foreign lobbying would also deliver the implication that a
country’s policies would be tilted to partly reﬂect the interests of foreign residents.33 Still,
the determinants of equilibrium policies would be distinct from those in our model. Instead
of maximizing a weighted sum of domestic and foreign aggregate welfare, governments would
instead maximize a weighted sum of aggregate domestic welfare and the welfare of the par-
ticular foreign residents engaged in cross-border lobbying. This may appear to be a small
diﬀerence, but it implies signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the positive and normative conclusions of
these diﬀerent approaches.
Consider ﬁrst the positive implications of a model with foreign lobbying. Our model
suggests that an increase in the level of policy externalities exerted by a country on the
rest of the world will naturally increase the incentives for foreign countries to shape its
policies and will lead to relatively more distorted policies in that country. In a model in
which the only foreign voice represented in that country is that of particular producers, it is
hard to envision why general policy externalities would aﬀect the equilibrium level of policy
distortions. Foreign lobbies act only insofar as their narrow interests are threatened. Hence,
such a model would not be able to explain the aforementioned inﬂuence activities in reaction
to the accession of a country to a position of general international signiﬁcance, such as the
UN Security Council.
Regarding the normative implications of our model, the divergences with a framework
with foreign lobbying are important. Note that in such model, externalities will only be
33See, for instance, Gawande et al., 2006. In their paper, foreign lobbying can also prove to be welfare-
enhancing but for a diﬀerent reason than in our paper; namely, because foreign lobbies help alleviate do-
mestic distortions stemming from internal lobbying. Our approach shows that even when domestic electoral
competition leads to unilaterally eﬃcient policies, two-way foreign inﬂuence between two countries can be
beneﬁcial.
32internalized to the extent that they speciﬁcally aﬀect the foreign lobby. Hence, it will be
much more diﬃcult to generate cases in which foreign lobbying can be Pareto improving
unless the lobby is very well aligned with the population at large. For the same reason, it is
far from clear in such a model that an increase in the power of a country implies an increase
in this country’s welfare. Note that with direct foreign lobbying, what matters is the ability
of the lobby, not the power of the country in which it is based.34
4 An Application: Revisiting the Optimal Tariﬀ
In this section, we consider an application of our model of foreign inﬂuence to the study
of optimal import tariﬀs. We develop a simple general-equilibrium model of trade with
quasilinear preferences, that allows for a sector by sector study of trade policy choices.
The model will provide an economic foundation for the abstract indirect utility function
vj ¡
τH,τF¢
used above. Furthermore, our assumptions will imply that vj ¡
τH,τF¢
will be
separable in its arguments, which will greatly simplify the analysis.
4.1 Economic Model
Consider a world consisting of two countries: Home and Foreign. Each country is populated
by a continuum of measure one of individuals with identical preferences:
u
j = c
j
0 +
2 X
i=1
u
j
i
¡
c
j
i
¢
, j = H,F (20)
where u
j
i (·) is increasing and strictly concave. All individuals inelastically supply one unit
of labor. Good 0 serves as the numeraire, is costlessly traded and not subject to tariﬀs. Its
world and domestic price is normalized to 1. It is produced one to one with labor everywhere
in the world, which pins down the wage rate to 1 in all countries. The other goods can also be
traded internationally, but for one unit of good i to make it to the other country, di > 1 units
have to be shipped. We shall also assume that good 1 is a “natural export” of Home, while
34While the present paper restricts its attention to government to government pressures with homogeneous
citizens, lobbying by domestic and foreign special interests would naturally interact with these pressures. As
pointed out by Putnam (1988), international policy making is best represented as a two-layer game in which
foreign policy is constrained by the pressure of domestic interest groups (see also Grossman and Helpman,
1994, 1995 and Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare, 2007). A full-ﬂedged analysis of international inﬂuence in the
presence of lobbies needs to consider at least three issues. First, whether domestic lobbies and foreign lobbies
of similar interests might cooperate. Second, the reasons local producers sometimes choose to lobby their
own government for foreign inﬂuence, while other times they choose to lobby abroad directly. Third, the
eﬀect that domestic lobbies can have in dampening foreign inﬂuence by promising contributions to parties
that defend the national interest. We are exploring these questions in ongoing work.
33good 2 is a “natural export” of Foreign.35 More precisely, we assume that trade policy and
“foreign inﬂuence” cannot revert “natural” comparative advantage patterns. The examples
below will feature this property.
For simplicity, we will focus on a world in which countries only tax their imports. As is
well-known, countries may ﬁnd it optimal to use import tariﬀst os h i f tt h et e r m so ft r a d e
in their favor. Let pW
i denote the world untaxed price of good i. This corresponds to the
price paid by consumers in the exporting country, since there are no taxes nor transport
costs involved in that transaction. On the other hand, the domestic price in the importing
country j will be given by τ
j
idipW
i ,w h e r edi denotes the (exogenous) transport cost while
τ
j
i −1 denotes the import tariﬀ (to be derived below). To see this, note that if the domestic
price was larger than τ
j
idipW
i ,t h e ne x p o r t e r sw o u l dn o tw a n tt os e l li nt h e i ro w nc o u n t r y ,
while if the price was lower than τ
j
idipW
i ,t h e yw o u l dn o tw a n tt oe x p o r t .W ec a ns u m m a r i z e
this as follows:
p
j
i =
(
pW
i if j exports i
τ
j
idipW
i otherwise
.( 2 1 )
Non-numeraire goods are produced combining labor and sector-speciﬁc capital according
to a constant returns to scale technology. Let Π
j
i be the aggregate rent accruing to sector i
speciﬁc factor in country j. Capital is evenly distributed among the measure 1 of workers in
each country.
A convenient property of the quasilinear representation of preferences in (20) is that
aggregate welfare in country j c a nb ew r i t t e na s
v
j (p)=I
j (p)+S
j (p),( 2 2 )
where Ij (p) denotes aggregate income in country j, Sj (p) denotes consumer surplus, and p
is the vector of domestic prices p ≡
¡
1,p
j
1,p
j
2
¢
. Given our assumptions, we can further write
aggregate income in country j as
I
j =1+Π
j
1
¡
p
j
1
¢
+ Π
j
2
¡
p
j
2
¢
+ R
j ¡
τ,p
W¢
,( 2 3 )
where
R
j ¡
τ,p
W¢
=
( ¡
τH
2 − 1
¢
d2pW
2
¡
cH
2
¡
pH
2
¢
− yH
2
¡
pH
2
¢¢
if j = H
¡
τF
1 − 1
¢
d1pW
1
¡
cF
1
¡
pF
1
¢
− yF
1
¡
pF
1
¢¢
if j = F
(24)
35We could easily extend the analysis to the case of N>2 goods.
34is tariﬀ revenue in country j.36 Note also that consumer surplus is simply given by:
S
j (p)=
2 X
i=1
£
u
j
i
¡
c
j
i
¡
p
j
i
¢¢
− p
j
ic
j
i
¡
p
j
i
¢¤
.( 2 5 )
Given quasilinear preferences, we can study trade policy good by good. We can focus on
the problem of a single country setting tariﬀs on the good that is a natural import for that
country. In doing so, it is important to remember that the world price pW
i is endogenous and
must satisfy market clearing, or
diM
j
i
¡
p
j
i
¢
≡ di
¡
c
j
i
¡
p
j
i
¢
− y
j
i
¡
p
j
i
¢¢
= y
−j
i
¡
p
W
i
¢
− c
−j
i
¡
p
W
i
¢
≡ X
−j
i
¡
p
W
i
¢
for j 6= −j.( 2 6 )
4.2 Optimal Tariﬀs: General Formula
Consider ﬁrst the determination of optimal tariﬀs in the standard case without foreign inﬂu-
ence. As argued above, the optimal tariﬀ in country j will then satisfy ∂vj ¡
τH,τF¢
/∂τj =0 ,
where vj ¡
τH,τF¢
is now given by (22) together with equations (23) through (26).
For simplicity, let us consider the determination of the optimal tariﬀ for the Home country.
Ignoring the irrelevant terms, we can write the Home government problem as:
max
τH Π
H
2
¡
p
H
2
¢
+
¡
τ
H − 1
¢
d2p
W
2
¡
c
H
2
¡
p
H
2
¢
− y
H
2
¡
p
H
2
¢¢
+ u
H
2
¡
c
H
2
¡
p
H
2
¢¢
− p
H
2 c
H
2
¡
p
H
2
¢
,
subject to pH
2 = τHd2pW
2 and d2
¡
cH
2
¡
pH
2
¢
− yH
2
¡
pH
2
¢¢
= yF
2
¡
pW
2
¢
− cF
2
¡
pW
2
¢
.S o l v i n g t h i s
program we ﬁnd the standard formula:
˜ τ
H − 1=
1
ξ
F
2
≡
XF
2
¡
pW
2
¢
pW
2 XF0
2 (pW
2 )
.( 2 7 )
In words, the (percentage) Home optimal tariﬀ in sector 2 is equal to the inverse of the
export supply elasticity of the Foreign country.
We can next study the optimal tariﬀs in the Home country whenever the Foreign country
m e d d l e si nt h ep o l i t i c a lp r o c e s si nt h eH o m ec o u n t r y .B e c a u s et h eH o m ei m p o r tt a r i ﬀ exerts
a negative externality on Foreign welfare, our results in section 3 indicate that the Home
tariﬀ under Foreign inﬂuence will be lower than that in equation (27). Given our results in
36An implicit assumption in the tariﬀ revenue function is that tariﬀs are imposed on the CIF (rather than
the FOB) value of imports. This squares well with common practice.
35Proposition 2, the Home optimal tariﬀ now solves:
max
τH Π
H
2
¡
p
H
2
¢
+
¡
τ
H − 1
¢
d2p
W
2
¡
c
H
2
¡
p
H
2
¢
− y
H
2
¡
p
H
2
¢¢
+ u
H
2
¡
c
H
2
¡
p
H
2
¢¢
− p
H
2 c
H
2
¡
p
H
2
¢
+μ
F→H £
Π
F
2
¡
p
W
2
¢
+ u
F
2
¡
c
F
2
¡
p
W
2
¢¢
− p
W
2 c
F
2
¡
p
W
2
¢¤
,
subject again to pH
2 = τHd2pW
2 and d2 ·
¡
cH
2
¡
pH
2
¢
− yH
2
¡
pH
2
¢¢
= yF
2
¡
pW
i
¢
− cF
2
¡
pW
i
¢
.T h i s
program delivers the following solution
ˆ τ
H − 1=
¡
1 − μ
F→H¢ 1
ξ
F
2
≡
¡
1 − μ
F→H¢ XF
2
¡
pW
2
¢
pW
2 XF0
2 (pW
2 )
. (28)
Note that when μF→H =0 , the Foreign country does not exert any inﬂuence at Home, and
naturally we obtain the same expression as in equation (27). Conversely, when μF→H =1 ,
Foreign’s inﬂuence is so powerful that it precludes any terms-of-trade manipulation on the
part of the Home country. In such a case, and given that we rule out the use of export
taxes by the Foreign country, we have that Foreign’s inﬂuence leads to free trade in sector
2. This is not surprising because, in such a case, the Home country would be choosing τH
to maximize aggregate world welfare, and this is achieved with free trade.37
I nt h ei n t e r m e d i a t ec a s e si nw h i c hμF→H ∈ (0,1),w eh a v et h a tH o m e ’ so p t i m a lt a r i ﬀ is
still positive but lower than the optimal one when μF→H =0 . This result may be helpful in
understanding the results of Broda, Limao and Weinstein (2006), who ﬁnd a positive corre-
lation between import tariﬀs and inverse export supply elasticities for WTO non-members,
but with a coeﬃcient markedly lower than that implied by standard theory.
So far we have focused on the characterization of the Home optimal tariﬀ. In a manner
analogous, one can solve for the Foreign optimal import tariﬀ in sector 1, which is given by
ˆ τ
F − 1=
¡
1 − μ
H→F¢ 1
ξ
H
1
≡
¡
1 − μ
H→F¢ XH
1
¡
pW
1
¢
pW
1 XH0
1 (pW
1 )
.
As simple as these formulas appear, it is important to note that the distorted tariﬀsa r e
not simple fractions of the standard tariﬀs with no foreign inﬂuence. In particular, these
tariﬀs are expressed as functions of export supply elasticities, which in turn are endogenous.
To gain a better understanding as to how the foreign inﬂuence weights μH→F and μF→H
aﬀect the equilibrium tariﬀs, we next move to a parametric example with linear demand and
supply functions that has been widely used in the literature.
37In the extreme case in which μF→H > 1, our theory predicts that the Home country will adopt an import
subsidy.
364.3 Example: A Linear Model
Consider the particular linear case developed among others by Bond and Park (2002) and
Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (2007). More speciﬁcally, we assume that the utility functions
u
j
i in (20) are quadratic, so that demand functions are linear and given by
c
H
i
¡
p
H
i
¢
= λ
¡
α
H
i − βp
H
i
¢
,
c
F
i
¡
p
F
i
¢
= α
F
i − βp
F
i ,
for i =1 ,2,w h e r eαH
2 = αF
1 = αL >α S = αH
1 = αF
2 . Furthermore, the rent functions Π
j
i are
also assumed to be quadratic, thus leading to linear supply functions in each country:38
y
H
i
¡
p
H
i
¢
= λ
¡
a + bp
H
i
¢
y
F
i
¡
p
F
i
¢
= a + bp
F
i ,
for i =1 ,2.
Notice that both countries share similar demand and supply functions, but Home demand
is disproportionately large in sector 2, while Foreign demand is disproportionately large in
sector 1. Furthermore, the parameter λ captures the relative size of the Home country
relative to the Foreign country.
Let us focus ﬁrst on the determination of the Home import tariﬀ in sector 2. Note that
Foreign exports in that sector are given by
X
F
2 = a − αS +( b + β)p
W
2 ,( 2 9 )
w h i l eH o m ei m p o r t sa r e
M
H
2 = λ
¡
αL − a − (b + β)τ
Hdp
W
2
¢
.
Goods market clearing — dMH
2 = XF
2 — thus implies that the world price in sector 2 is given
by:
p
W
2 =
λd(αL − a)+αS − a
(b + β)(λd2τH +1 )
.( 3 0 )
In order to ensure that Home is a “natural importer” in sector 2, we assume that
(αL − a) > (αS − a)d, which necessarily holds for suﬃciently small transport costs (i.e.,
d close enough to 1).39 Combining equations (27) and (29) we can then express the optimal
38Remember that by Hotelling’s lemma, we have that Π
j0
i
³
p
j
i
´
= y
j
i
39It may be thought that the endogenous determination of τH could lead to a reversal of the pattern of
37tariﬀ ˆ τ
H as a function of exogenous parameters:
˜ τ
H − 1=
(αL − a) − (αS − a)d
(αL − a)+( αS − a)
¡
1
λd + d
¢.( 3 1 )
Quite naturally, and as emphasized by the existing literature, the larger is the Home coun-
try relative to the Foreign country (a larger λ), the larger is the optimal tariﬀ at Home.
Furthermore, this optimal tariﬀ converges to 0 when λ → 0.
Following similar steps, we ﬁnd that the optimal import tariﬀ in Foreign (applying to
sector 1) is given by:
˜ τ
F − 1=
(αL − a) − (αS − a)d
(αL − a)+
¡
λ
d + d
¢
(αS − a)
,( 3 2 )
which is naturally decreasing in λ and approaches 0 when λ →∞ .
We can next compare these tariﬀs to the ones that emerge in the case of foreign inﬂuence.
Combining equations (28) and (29) we ﬁnd that in such a case, the Home and Foreign import
tariﬀsa r eg i v e nb y :
ˆ τ
H − 1=
¡
1 − μF→H¢
(αL − a − d(αS − a))
(αL − a)+( αS − a)
¡
1
λd + d(1 − μF→H)
¢ (33)
and
ˆ τ
F − 1=
¡
1 − μH→F¢
(αL − a − (αS − a)d)
(αL − a)+( αS − a)
¡
λ
d +( 1− μH→F)d
¢ (34)
respectively. Again ˆ τ
H is increasing in λ, while ˆ τ
F is decreasing in λ. We next consider the
following measure of distortions:
Γ
j =
˜ τj − 1
ˆ τ
j − 1
− 1 > 0, j = H,F, (35)
which naturally equals 0 when μH→F = μF→H =0and is larger the more distorted (down-
wards) is country j’s tariﬀ.W i t ht h i sd e ﬁnition in hand, we ﬁnd that (see Appendix for the
proof):
Proposition 7 The distortion ΓH in the Home tariﬀ τH is increasing in Foreign’s political
power μF→H, decreasing in the distance d between the two countries, and also decreasing in
the relative size λ of Home.
The ﬁrst result is intuitive and follows directly from Proposition 3. In particular, given
that the Home import tariﬀ generates a negative externality in Foreign, the size of this tariﬀ
trade, but it is straightforward to show that, as long as (αL − a) > (αS − a)d,t h eo p t i m a lτH is always
such that Home imports good 2 in equilibrium.
38will be decreasing in the inﬂuence power μF→H of Foreign. The negative eﬀect of distance
on the size of the distortion is related to our discussion of the eﬀect of changes in the size of
policy externalities in Proposition 4.40 More speciﬁcally, the size of the negative externality
generated by Foreign is decreasing in the distance between Home and Foreign, and therefore
it is not surprising that the extent to which the Home tariﬀ is distorted is lower when distance
is higher. This result is interesting because it provides a rationale for the fact that most
instances of active foreign inﬂuence occur between relatively close countries. Our ﬁnal result
is that relatively large countries tend to be inﬂuenced relatively less, even when they are not
more politically powerful (in terms of the μ’s) than smaller countries. The reason for this
is related to the fact that the absolute value of the utility gain of inﬂuence for the Foreign
country relative to the absolute value of the utility loss at Home is lower, the lower Foreign
is relative to Home. Consequently, the amount of resources that Foreign can threaten to use
to inﬂu e n c eH o m ep o l i t i c sw i l lt e n dt ob er e l a t i v e l yl o ww h e nλ is high.
When studying the analogous determinants of the import tariﬀ distortion in Foreign we
ﬁnd that (see Appendix for the proof):
Proposition 8 The distortion ΓF in the Foreign tariﬀ τF is increasing in Home’s political
power μH→F, decreasing in the distance d between the two countries, and increasing in the
relative size λof Home.
For the same reasons as above, we have that the size of the distortions will be larger
for countries that are geographically close to politically powerful and economically large
countries.
4.4 Inﬂuence Power and Trade Talks
We ﬁnally consider how foreign inﬂuence aﬀects the likelihood that countries will have an
incentive to sign a free trade agreement. In his seminal paper, Johnson (1953-54) showed
that when two countries are suﬃciently asymmetric in size, the larger country might be
better oﬀ under the status quo set of tariﬀs than under free trade. In the absence of lump-
sum transfers across countries, which has been a maintained assumption in our framework,
it then follows that free trade will only come about for suﬃciently symmetric countries. In
our framework, a free trade agreement may not be viable even when countries are of equal
size (λ =1 ), provided that one of them has disproportionately more inﬂuence power than
the other one. The logic for this result was explained in section 3.2 and illustrated in Figure
4 for the case of general indirect utility functions so it will not be repeated here.
40It should be noted, however, that d not only aﬀects the level of policy externalities, but also impacts the
sensitivity of a country’s welfare to its own policy, i.e., ∂vj (·)/τj.
39Our economic model however allows us to formally study the interaction of economic size
and inﬂuence power in aﬀecting the viability of free trade agreements. In particular, consider
t h ec a s ei nw h i c hλ is relatively small. In such a case, Johnson’s (1953-54) results suggest
t h a tf r e et r a d em i g h tn o tb ea c h i e v e de v e nw h e ni n ﬂuence power is balanced (e.g., when
μH→F = μF→H =0 )b e c a u s eF o r e i g nw i l lb l o c ki t .I nt h o s es i t u a t i o n s ,f r e et r a d ew i l lo n l yb e
achieved in a region of the parameter space in which the ratio μF→H/μH→F is relatively low
(but not too low), that is, whenever Home has relatively more inﬂuence power than Foreign,
as previously depicted in Figure 6. In other words, the achievement of free trade requires
a negative correlation between size and inﬂuence power. It is interesting to note that, in
the real world, we often observe a positive correlation between economic size and inﬂuence
power, which corresponds to situations in which according to our analysis, the achievement
of free trade is at greater risk.
5C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we have developed a model of foreign inﬂuence and have studied its welfare
implications. We have shown that the possibility of foreign meddling in electoral processes
may prove to be welfare enhancing from the point of view of world aggregate welfare. The
reason is that foreign inﬂuence is not random: foreigners will only exert costly inﬂuence
whenever policies in the inﬂuenced country generate externalities on them. As a result, the
possibility of foreign inﬂuence may help partially alleviate externalities arising from cross-
border eﬀects of policies.
We have shown, however, that large imbalances in inﬂuence power will tend to imply
that a world with access to foreign inﬂuence will not be Pareto superior to a world without
access to foreign inﬂuence. Countries with little inﬂuencing power will be made worse oﬀ by
foreign meddling, while they will not be able to tilt foreign policies to their advantage. Fur-
thermore, imbalances of inﬂuencing power between countries have also been shown to hinder
the viability of international agreements that fully internalize cross-border externalities.
We have also studied an application of our setup to the study of import tariﬀs. Foreign
inﬂuence has been shown to decrease the Nash equilibrium tariﬀ choices of countries, with
the eﬀect being disproportionately larger for geographically close countries. Nevertheless, we
have also demonstrated that suﬃciently large imbalances in inﬂuencing power may hinder
the transition to a world with free trade.
Our framework is special in many respects. First, in our deterministic setup, foreign
inﬂuence only occurs oﬀ-the-equilibrium path. It would be interesting to modify our model
so as to deliver sharper predictions regarding the type of situations in which we expect
40foreign inﬂuence to emerge in equilibrium, and also in order to take into account these costs
in evaluating the welfare gains from foreign inﬂuence. Second, our model has abstracted
from domestic conﬂict (either driven by ideology or special interests): the inﬂuencing eﬀorts
of each country’s incumbent government have sought to protect the general interests of its
population. In practice, foreign inﬂuence often defends in a disproportionate manner the
interests of particular economic agents. It seems reasonable that a proper modelling of these
forces could lead to further qualiﬁcations of our main welfare results. We are currently
exploring these issues in ongoing research.
41A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Equation (4) implicitly deﬁnes the best response τ
j
c of political party c as a function of the strategy
τ
j
−c of the other political party in country j.W eﬁrst show that this ﬁrst-order condition can be
satisﬁed only if ∂vj
³
τ
j
c
´
/∂τ
j
c =0 . To prove this, assume instead that (4) holds because
αjγj +
¡
1 − αj¢
γj
³
vj ¡
τj
c
¢
− vj
³
τ
j
−c
´´
+
¡
1 − αj¢
Pj
c =0 .
Because P
j
c ∈ [0,1], this could only be the case if
αj +
¡
1 − αj¢³
vj ¡
τj
c
¢
− vj
³
τ
j
−c
´´
≤ 0.( 3 6 )
Note, however, that when this condition holds, we can conclude that party c’s welfare W
j
c satisﬁes:
Wj
c = Pj
c
³
αj +
¡
1 − αj¢³
vj ¡
τj
c
¢
− vj
³
τ
j
−c
´´´
+ vj
³
τ
j
−c
´
≤ vj
³
τ
j
−c
´
<
1
2
αj + vj
³
τ
j
−c
´
,
where the right-hand-side is the welfare that party c can secure by using the simple (sub-optimal)
strategy τ
j
c = τ
j
−c. This shows that any τ
j
c that satisﬁed (40) cannot be part of party c’s best
response function. In sum, we must have αjγj+
¡
1 − αj¢
γj
³
vj
³
τ
j
c
´
− vj
³
τ
j
−c
´´
+
¡
1 − αj¢
P
j
c > 0
and thus only ∂vj
³
τ
j
c
´
/∂τ
j
c =0is consistent with the ﬁrst-order condition in (4).
Next, we can compute the second-order-condition to obtain:
n
αjγj +
¡
1 − αj¢
γj
³
vj ¡
τj
c
¢
− vj
³
τ
j
−c
´´
+
¡
1 − αj¢
Pj
c
o ∂2vj
³
τ
j
c
´
∂
³
τ
j
c
´2 +2
¡
1 − αj¢
γj
⎛
⎝
∂vj
³
τ
j
c
´
∂τ
j
c
⎞
⎠
2
.
Given the concavity of the function vj
³
τ
j
c
´
and the fact that ∂vj
³
τ
j
c
´
/∂τ
j
c =0at the optimum
˜ τj, it is clear that this expression is negative and thus ˜ τj is a global maximum.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
We ﬁrst show that the problem of the opposition party at Home is symmetric to that of the
incumbent party in that country. The opposition seeks to maximize
WH
O = αH ¡
1 − PH
I
¢
+
¡
1 − αH¢¡
PH
I vH ¡
τH
I ,τF¢
+
¡
1 − PH
I
¢
vH ¡
τH
O,τF¢¢
subject to
PH
I =
1
2
+ γH ¡
vH ¡
τH
I ,τF¢
− vH ¡
τH
O,τF¢
− θHˆ eF¢
(37)
42and
ˆ eF = −
¡
1 − αF¢
γHθHφF ¡
vF ¡
τH
I ,τF¢
− vF ¡
τH
O,τF¢¢
.
The ﬁrst-order condition of the problem is then
−αH ∂PH
I
∂τH
O
+
¡
1 − αH¢¡
1 − PH
I
¢ ∂vH ¡
τH
O,τF¢
∂τH
O
+
¡
1 − αH¢ ∂PH
I
∂τH
O
¡
vH ¡
τH
I ,τF¢
− vH ¡
τH
O,τF¢¢
=0
which results in
"
αHγH + 1
2
¡
1 − αH¢
+2
¡
1 − αH¢
γH ¡
vH ¡
τH
O,τF¢
− vH ¡
τH
I ,τF¢¢
+
¡
1 − αH¢
φF ¡
1 − αF¢¡
γHθH¢2 ¡
vF ¡
τH
O,τF¢
− vF ¡
τH
I ,τF¢¢
#
×
∂vH ¡
τH
O,τF¢
∂τH
O
+
¡
αH +
¡
1 − αH¢¡
vH ¡
τH
O,τF¢
− vH ¡
τH
I ,τF¢¢¢
φF ¡
1 − αF¢¡
γHθH¢2
×
∂vF ¡
τH
O,τF¢
∂τH
O
=0 .
(38)
This equation deﬁnes the Home’s opposition best response function. Note that this equation is
entirely symmetric to equation (12) in the main text. This suggests that incumbent and opposition
best response function will intersect at a point in which τH
I = τH
O = τH, hence delivering the
representation result in Proposition 2.
Nevertheless, we still need to verify that this solution corresponds to the unique intersection
of each Home party’ reaction function (given policy convergence in the Foreign country), and also
that the second-order conditions for a maximum are satisﬁed at this solution. For that purpose, we
ﬁrst further characterize the best response function of Home’s opposition party by diﬀerentiating
the ﬁrst-order condition (and using (38) and the deﬁnition of PH
O =1−PH
I in (37) to simplify) to
obtain the following second-order-condition:
£
αHγH +
¡
1 − αH¢
γH ¡
vH ¡
τH
O,τF¢
− vH ¡
τH
I ,τF¢¢¤ ∂2vH ¡
τH
O,τF¢
∂
¡
τH
O
¢2 +
¡
1 − αH¢
PH
O
∂2vH ¡
τH
O,τF¢
∂
¡
τH
O
¢2
+
¡
αH +
¡
1 − αH¢¡
vH ¡
τH
O,τF¢
− vH ¡
τH
I ,τF¢¢¢
φF ¡
1 − αF¢¡
γHθH¢2
×
∂2vF ¡
τH
O,τF¢
∂
¡
τH
O
¢2
−
−2
¡
1 − αH¢2 PH
O ¡
αH +( 1− αH)
¡
vH ¡
τH
O,τF¢
− vH ¡
τH
I ,τF¢¢¢
Ã
∂vH ¡
τH
O,τF¢
∂τH
O
!2
. (39)
This equation suggests that the opposition’s party welfare is not globally concave in their
announced policy τH
O. Still, given the concavity of the vj (·) functions, we see that the function is
strictly concave for the set of announced policies τH
O that satisfy
αH +
¡
1 − αH¢¡
vH ¡
τH
O,τF¢
− vH ¡
τH
I ,τF¢¢
> 0.( 4 0 )
43Hence, there can be at most one τH
O satisfying (40) that maximizes WH
O . We still need to rule out,
however, the existence of a potential alternative solution ˇ τH
O that violates (40) but still satisﬁes
the ﬁrst-order condition in (38) and the second-order condition in (39), and translates into a larger
value of WH
O than the unique maximizer that satisﬁes (40). We can conclude this by noting that
whenever (40) is violated, we can write
WH
O
¡
ˇ τH
O
¢
=
¡
1 − PH
I
¢£
αH +
¡
1 − αH¢¡¡
vH ¡
ˇ τH
O,τF¢
− vH ¡
τH
I ,τF¢¢¢¤
+
¡
1 − αH¢
vH ¡
τH
I ,τF¢
≤
¡
1 − αH¢
vH ¡
τH
I ,τF¢
<
1
2
αH +
¡
1 − αH¢
vH ¡
τH
I ,τF¢
,
where the latter is the welfare that the opposition party can secure by using the simple (sub-optimal)
strategy τH
O = τH
I . This shows that any ˇ τH
O that violates (40) cannot be part of the opposition’s
best response function. This in turn implies that the solution to (12) is unique and, because the
Home incumbent’s problem is entirely symmetric, we have that the unique intersection of the two
p a r t i e sa tH o m en e c e s s a r i l yl e a d st oτH
O = τH
I . Furthermore, whenever τH
O = τH
I , the condition
in (40) is satisﬁed, so the second-order conditions associated with the convergent equilibrium are
satisﬁed. Finally, solving the analogous problem of the Foreign incumbent and opposition parties,
one can also conclude that, given policy convergence at Home, policy convergence in Foreign will
result. This concludes the proof of existence of the convergent equilibrium described in Proposition
2.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
We ﬁrst totally diﬀerentiate the system in (15) and (16) with respect to μF→H,a n dw r i t ei ti n
compact (matrix) form (throughout the proof we ignore hats on the equilibrium policies τH and
τF in order to avoid cluttered notation):
⎡
⎢
⎣
∂2vH(τH,τF)
∂(τH)
2 + μF→H ∂2vF(τH,τF)
∂(τH)
2
∂2vH(τH,τF)
∂τH∂τF + μF→H ∂2vF(τH,τF)
∂τH∂τF
∂2vF(τH,τF)
∂τH∂τF + μH→F ∂2vH(τH,τF)
∂τH∂τF
∂2vF(τH,τF)
∂(τF)
2 + μH→F ∂2vH(τH,τF)
∂(τF)
2
⎤
⎥
⎦×
"
dτH
dμF→H
dτF
dμF→H
#
=
"
−
∂vF(τH,τF)
∂τH
0
#
The determinant of the 2 × 2 left-hand-side matrix (call it A) is complicated, but we can appeal
t os t a b i l i t yt os h o wt h a ti tm u s tb ep o s i t i v e .I nparticular, from equations (17) and (18) we have
that |A| > 0 if and only if the absolute value of the slope of the Home reaction function is higher
than that of the Foreign reaction function, which is a necessary condition for the equilibrium pair
¡
τH,τF¢
to be stable.
Next we can use Cramer’s rule to obtain
dτH
dμF→H =
−
∂vF(τH,τF)
∂τH
µ
∂2vF(τH,τF)
∂(τF)
2 + μH→F ∂2vH(τH,τF)
∂(τF)
2
¶
|A|
,
44which given concavity of vj (·) has the same sign as ∂vF ¡
τH,τF¢
/∂τH. Hence, as stated in the
Proposition, an increase in μF→H leads to a reduction in τH if and only if there are negative policy
externalities. The proof of the analogous result involving the eﬀect of an increase in μH→F on τF
can be derived in the same manner.
As for the eﬀect of μF→H on the equilibrium τF, we can use Cramer’s rule to obtain
dτF
dμF→H =
µ
∂2vF(τH,τF)
∂τH∂τF + μH→F ∂2vH(τH,τF)
∂τH∂τF
¶
−
³
∂2vF(τH,τF)
∂(τF)
2 + μH→F ∂2vH(τH,τF)
∂(τF)
2
´
dτH
dμF→H ,
which conﬁrms that ˆ τH and ˆ τF shift in the same direction whenever the vj ¡
τH,τF¢
functions are
supermodular in τH and τF for j = H,F (i.e.,
∂2vj(τH,τF)
∂τH∂τF > 0). The shifts are in opposite directions
for the case of submodular vj (·) functions, while ˆ τF is not aﬀected when the vj (·) functions are
separable.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
Remember from our formal deﬁnition of the level of policy externalities (see footnote 27) that we are
considering an increase in a parameter κk,j that raises
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
∂vj(τH,τF)
∂τk
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ for j 6= k. Consider an increase
in the level of policy externalities κH,F exerted by Home on Foreign (the case of an increase in κF,H
can be studied in an analogous way). Totally diﬀerentiating the ﬁrst order conditions, we have
⎡
⎢
⎣
∂2vH(τH,τF)
∂(τH)
2 + μF→H ∂2vF(τH,τF)
∂(τH)
2
∂2vH(τH,τF)
∂τH∂τF + μF→H ∂2vF(τH,τF)
∂τH∂τF
∂2vF(τH,τF)
∂τH∂τF + μH→F ∂2vH(τH,τF)
∂τH∂τF
∂2vF(τH,τF)
∂(τF)
2 + μH→F ∂2vH(τH,τF)
∂(τF)
2
⎤
⎥
⎦×
"
dτH
dκH,F
dτF
dκH,F
#
=
⎡
⎣ −
∂2vF(τH,τF)
∂τH∂κH,F μF→H
0
⎤
⎦.
Because κk,j increases
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
∂vj(τH,τF)
∂τk
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯, it is clear that
∂2vF(τH,τF)
∂τH∂κH,F inherits the sign of policy external-
ities, i.e.,
∂vF(τH,τF)
∂τH . This in turn implies that the comparative statics with respect to κH,F are
qualitatively identical to those with respect to μF→H. The statement in Proposition 4 is thus a
corollary of Proposition 3.
A.5 Proof of Propositions 5 and 6
Consider the eﬀects of an increase in μF→H on Home and Foreign welfare (the case of an increase
in μH→F is symmetric). Note that these are given by (again we drop the hats over equilibrium
45policies to simplify the algebra):
dvH
dμF→H =
∂vH ¡
τH,τF¢
∂τH
dτH
dμF→H +
∂vH ¡
τH,τF¢
∂τF
dτF
dμF→H (41)
dvF
dμF→H =
∂vF ¡
τH,τF¢
∂τH
dτH
dμF→H +
∂vF ¡
τH,τF¢
∂τF
dτF
dμF→H .( 4 2 )
Part 1 of Proposition 3 immediately implies that the ﬁrst term in the right-hand-side of (42) is
positive. Using equation (15), it is straightforward to verify that part 1 of Proposition 3 also implies
that the ﬁrst term in the right-hand-side of (41) is negative.
When the functions vj (·) are additively separable, part 2 of Proposition 3 implies that the
second terms in the right-hand-side of both (41) and (42) are 0. We thus conclude dvH/dμF→H < 0
and dvF/dμF→H > 0,w h i c hc o n ﬁrms part 1 of Proposition 5.
Consider next the case of submodular welfare functions. In such a case, part 4 of Proposition
3 implies that the second term in the right-hand-side of (41) is negative, and coupled with (16), it
also implies that the second term in the right-hand-side of (42) is positive. We thus obtain that
for arbitrary submodular functions, we still have that dvH/dμF→H < 0 and dvF/dμF→H > 0,a s
stated in part 1(a) of Proposition 6.
The case of supermodular welfare functions is a bit more complex because the ﬁrst and second
terms in the right-hand-side of (41) and (42) are of opposite signs (again this can be veriﬁed
by appealing to Proposition 3). Still, as long as ∂2vj/∂τH∂τF is small enough, the size of the
second terms will be too small to overturn the sign of the ﬁrst terms, and we will again have that
dvH/dμF→H < 0 and dvF/dμF→H > 0. This justiﬁes our statement part 1(b) in Proposition 6.
We next move on to discuss the eﬀects of an increase in μF→H on aggregate world welfare.
From equation (19) we have
d
¡
vH (·)+vF (·)
¢
dμF→H =
¡
1 − μF→H¢ ∂vF (·)
∂τH
dτH
dμF→H +
¡
1 − μH→F¢ ∂vH (·)
∂τF
dτF
dμF→H .( 4 3 )
The sign of this eﬀect obviously depends on whether μF→H and μH→F are larger or smaller than
one. From our above discussion, part 1 of Proposition 3 immediately implies that the ﬁrst term
in the right-hand-side of (43) is necessarily positive whenever μF→H < 1 and necessarily negative
whenever μF→H > 1. Hence, if the second term in the right-hand-side of (43) is small enough,
we will obtain that world welfare is increasing in the inﬂuence power of any country j whenever
μj→k < 1 and is decreasing in this inﬂuence power for μj→k > 1. Whenever the functions vj (·)
are additively separable, this second term is equal to 0 and we thus obtain part 2 of Proposition
5. Whenever the functions vj (·) are supermodular, the term
∂vH(·)
∂τF
dτF
dμF→H will be non-negligible,
but from our discussion above, Proposition 3 implies that it will necessarily be positive. This
naturally leads to the result stated in part 2(a) of Proposition 6. In the case of submodular welfare
functions, the term
∂vH(·)
∂τF
dτF
dμF→H is negative and, theoretically, the overall eﬀe c to fa ni n c r e a s ei n
46μF→H on world welfare may well be negative. Still, as stated in part 2(b) of Proposition 6, as long
as
¯ ¯∂2vj/∂τH∂τF¯ ¯ is small enough, the sign of the overall eﬀect will be governed by the ﬁrst term.
A.6 Proof of Propositions 7 and 8
The results follow from simple diﬀerentiation. Combining equations (31), (32), (33), (34),and (35),
we have
ΓH =
μF→H ¡
(αL − a)+( αS − a) 1
λd
¢
(1 − μF→H)
¡
(αL − a)+( αS − a)
¡ 1
λd + d
¢¢
and
ΓF =
μH→F ¡
(αL − a)+( αS − a) λ
d
¢
(1 − μH→F)
¡
(αL − a)+
¡λ
d + d
¢
(αS − a)
¢
It is apparent that ∂ΓH/∂μF→H > 0 and ∂ΓF/∂μH→F > 0. In words, the distortion in each
country is increasing in the other country’s inﬂuence power.
Next, note that
∂ΓH
∂λ
= −
μF→H (αS − a)
2
(1 − μF→H)λ2 ¡¡
(αL − a)+( αS − a)
¡ 1
λd + d
¢¢¢2 < 0
and
∂ΓF
∂λ
=
μH→F (αS − a)
2
(1 − μH→F)
¡¡
(αL − a)+( αS − a)
¡λ
d + d
¢¢¢2 > 0,
and hence, each country’s distortion is decreasing in their relative size.
Finally, note that
∂ΓH
∂d
= −
μF→H (αS − a)
¡
(αL − a)+2( αS − a) 1
λd
¢
(1 − μF→H)
¡¡
(αL − a)+( αS − a)
¡ 1
λd + d
¢¢¢2 < 0
and
∂ΓF
∂d
= −
μH→F (αS − a)
¡
(αL − a)+2( αS − a) λ
d
¢
(1 − μH→F)
¡¡
(αL − a)+( αS − a)
¡λ
d + d
¢¢¢2 < 0,
which implies that each country’s distortion is higher the lower is the distance between them.
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